upnorthkyosa said:
Thanks Paul, for backing up the point I was trying to make earlier. I think your word choice "dehumanization" works better then mine "hate". Are these two words so different though?
Paul and UpNorth:
I have a copy of "On Killing" and the interview, survey info that Grossman cites has as much to do with the difference in reaction training because of technology (WWII: smaller magazines of ammo, single shot, greater distances because of more open battle fields = more selective, lower rates of fire COMPARED TO Vietnam: Full auto weapon, less marksmanship training time relative to WWII soldiers, Closer contact distances and differences in tactical SOP's.... = more general, suppression and higher rates of fire).
The number of rounds thrown down range equating to more troops firing because of dehumanization training being more 'effective' is an assumption - supported with other data to prove a thesis. This means that the point is presented in a one sided manor. There are some valid things in Grossman's book, but I have a problem with the majority of data being from interview sources years after the events (time and distance adding color and nostalgia to the interviewee's interpretation - so some of the assumptions are that what the interviewee is saying he/she was going experiencing 'then' could really be what he/she is going through now in relation to the memories).
Technology has been attributed to the amount of Post Traumatic Stress/Shell Shock... because the speed with which the individual is reintroduced into the mainstream after combat service. WWII the transition was slower because of ship travel, slower planes.... the pace of travel alone, also units from Basic to dibanding moved together (Better espirit de Corps which aids in coping). Korea/Vietnam and after, the individuals could be leaving combat and dropped off within a very short period of time. That means that all those decompression things that you are going to go through will happen in the company of civilians and family who don't understand instead of fellow soldiers/Marines... Personally, we came back from Bosnia and I still don't like crowd all that much (just as an example), and my tour was nothing like what WWII, Korea, Vietnam or any of the more modern conflict were/are like.
As far as us, meaning the USA being not so good at stopping these attrocities: It is aweful, but I think it is to be expected - not tolerated - but expected. That is why I emphasize the importance of professional training of individuals and leaders as the preventative measure in place. They should (there will be some NCO's and Officers tagged on this stuff for not staying at the switch) be aware and adjust duties and assignments based on the signs that individuals are getting too wound up.
I think that, since it is going to happen, comparing our track record as a modern military force to that of other countries is the only realistic way to decide 'good at it' and based on that I would say that we are. Also, I think the punitive actions taken when an incident occurs sets a tone of intolerance of unprofessional, inhumane behavior.
Remember too, that these detention guards aren't in 'combat stress' conditions as much as they are the equivelant of Corrections Officers. The Stress syndrome excuse, the fatigue excuse and all that is BS as far as I am concerned. My old MP unit had the EPW/POW mission before it was redesignated to general/combat support missions. POW camp mission is almost like a regular job at times.
These individuals got too high on the amount of control they have over these prisoners and basically were the same as a predator playing with their food. This is different in nature to battlefield attrocities because the stress and fatigue and the environment is very different. That is not to say that any of these actions are to be tolerated.
What do we do? We, as in you and I, very little. They, as in the powers that be, review the training, the leadership and the schedule.... and make sure that the system you have set in place isn't the problem. If it is, fix it. If it isn't, did the NCO's / Officer's follow said procedures. If they did, and they can prove it, did the troops responsible KNOW what they were doing was wrong, if so nail them to the wall within the UCMJ.