Internet Scientific Publications
"Reaction to disaster
Factors that the public considers in reacting to a disaster warning include the significance of and understanding of the threat, and confidence (or lack thereof) in authorities. Initially, people make the determination whether or not the threat is real and they trust the source of information before taking action (Helsloot, & Ruitenberg, 2004).
During Hurricane Katrina, a large portion of the blame was placed on local, state and federal governments. Many individuals claimed the government responded to the hurricane and flooding too slowly, and felt there was no excuse for this. A survey conducted on Hurricane Katrina evacuees found that most individuals blamed the federal government, the state of Louisiana and the city of New Orleans for the problems that occurred due to the hurricane and flooding. A large number of evacuees believed the federal government would have responded more quickly to rescue efforts if more of them had been wealthier and white, rather than poorer and black. Thus, many blamed the government at the local, state and federal levels for the poor disaster response in the wake of Katrina, and they felt that the federal government did not care about āpeople like them' (Survey of Katrina Evacuees, 2005).
Garrett, & Sobel (2003) believe that this perception could be at least partially true. They determined that nearly half of all disaster relief is politically motivated, rather than by need. They found evidence of a higher rate of disaster declaration by the president in states that are politically important. This leads many states to be overlooked, even when legitimate disasters are suffered, often in favor of electoral vote-rich states that experience only mild natural occurrences. There is also a link between the political affiliation of the governor and the president during election years, with more disaster declarations being made in states politically important to the president. Research has shown that flood declarations are greater during presidential reelection years. For instance, in 1996 (President Clinton's reelection year) the level of disaster expenditures was roughly $140 million higher than in previous years. The unilateral nature of the Stafford Act makes this possible by allowing the president to bypass Congress, possibly punishing or rewarding legislators.
Disaster expenditures are also higher in states that have congressional representation on FEMA oversight committees (Garrett, & Sobel, 2003). States with legislators on a FEMA oversight subcommittee were estimated to receive an additional $31 million in excess expenditures. These statistics are disheartening to average citizens who place their trust in government officials to put personal interests aside for the public good.
Expectations about human response to disasters and terrorism are not compatible with known expected behavior under emergency conditions. Panic and dysfunctional behavior may differ from natural disasters and terrorist incidents. Disaster victims do not necessarily act in shock and panic, but more likely in response to what they believe is in their best interests given their limited understanding of the circumstances. Behavior in disaster response is generally pro-social as opposed to anti-social (i.e. looting), despite what is portrayed in popular media and press coverage (Perry, & Lindell, 2003; Helsloot, & Ruitenberg, 2004).
Generally people tend to act in pro-social ways, including performing acts of rescue and providing assistance and other altruistic responses. The myth of irrational and anti-social behavior can actually hamper disaster response planning when managers believe that giving incomplete or withholding information is justified. With incomplete information people are less likely to trust the sources and comply with recommendations (Perry, & Lindell, 2003)."