I have been fretting for a long time about why it is that the culture of the Korean fighting arts is so different from that of China, Okinawa and Korea (and, so far as I know, the MAs of Oceania, but I know very little about those, so won't presume to say) with respect to the issue of top-down organizational uniformity—unity, as its defenders like to say, enforced technical conformism, as its detractors might put it (and often do, at least in conversation :wink1
It's a topic that's been kicked around in various threads on MT, and I've my share of the kicking, but I haven't been completely happy with my attempts to explain the glaring discrepancy between the kind of Wild West diversity of MA styles in China and to a lesser but still respectable extent in Okinawa and Japan, on the one hand, and what seems to me the penchant in Korea for large MA organizations, tightly tied to the government, which attempt to dictate a uniform technical profile and which routinely, struggle for supremacy, i.e., the authority to impose that profile on MA schools. The emergence of the major KMAs in the post-liberation era, in a divided nation in which top-down military decision making was the order of the day on both sizes of the Korean DMZ, is surely an important factor; but recently, looking at both the thread here and here, another thought occurred to me. I want to try this out on people and see if you find it plausible...
Looking at the interview that Iceman posted a link to, there are some very interesting specific points relevant to TKD's history (Gm. Won Kuk Lee believes `that there is an overemphasis on kicking techniques at most schools', that there is virtually no documentary history for modern KMAs before the turn of the 20th c. (`There is no record of exactly who did what and when over the 2,000 year process. Literature on the specifics of development of Tae Kwondo is rare until modem times.'), and specifically that Tae Kyon, whatever it may have been, was essentially extinct three or four generations before Gm. Lee and his compatriots began to learn martial arts). The Gm.'s observation tie in, overall, very nicely with the massive documentary evidence supplied by Dakin Burdick (`People and events of Taekwando's Formative Years', Journal of Asian Martial Arts 6:1 (1997); see also the later, slightly different version at http://www.budosportcapelle.nl/gesch.html), Stanley Henning (Henning, S. `Traditional Korean martial arts' Journal of Asian Martial Arts 9:1 (2000)), Manuel AdroguĂ© (`Ancient military manuals and their relation to modern Korean martial arts', Journal of Asian Martial Arts 12:4 (2003)) and Steve Capener (`Problems in the identity and philosophy of Taegwondo and their historical causes', http://www.bigskytaekwondo.com/Resources/Capener.htm) for the very recent emergence of the Korean MAs on the almost exclusive base of Japanese karate (though there may be some influence from Chinese chuan fa as well), with hints here and there through what little documentation exists for the very strongly Chinese influence over Korean MAs at earlier phases, going back to the Three Kingdoms perior; a nicely balanced picture is given in the Wikipedia article on KMAs at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_martial_arts. But what most struck me about the interview with Gm. Lee—founder of the Chung Do Kwan arguably the oldest (viable) of the original Kwans and almost certainly the most influential and dominant during the Kwan era—was his constant insistence on the need for unity, and his criticism of others—including, from his tone, his own students—for what he calls the `fragmentation' of TKD:
The military, especially as represented by Gen. Choi, may have played a important role in imposing the kind of enforced unification that Gm. Lee seems to believe to be such a good thing, but there is no question that, with a few very notable exceptions such as Hwang Kee, the culture of Korean MA from the end of the war on has been entirely compatible with this regimentation. I've never been able to figure out exactly why that should be the case, though I've suspected for a long time that it had somethingn to do with the very recent origins of the modern KMAs....
But in thinking about the Okinawan karate thread (again, http://www.martialtalk.com/forum/showthread.php?t=52402]), it suddenly occurred to me that of all the Asian MAs, those of Korea are unique in the sense that they did not originate, and propagate, within families over a long period of time. The incredibly fine-grained complexity of the CMAs is due to their origins in particular family lineages, and the Okinawan thread echoes this family-based granularity, though obviously on a much smaller scale. In Japan, there are MAs (such as traditional, `castle-era' ninjutsu) which appear to have been propagated as specific family traditions, and while it's true that the budo arts are not so obviously rooted in particular family lines, the deep lineage of individual schools of swordsmanship provides a comparable `locality' for the transmission of techniques and martial secrets over generations. But, if the model of Korean MA history laid out in the detailed historical studies I've cited above (among others) is correct, the modern KMAs were not transmitted in this fashion. They were, instead, grafted into Korean culture in a remarkably short time: the Japanese occupation suppressed whatever indigenous arts were extant at the time—about which we have essentially no reliable information—substituting instruction in jiujitsu and kendo, as Burdick documents; subsequents instruction in even these arts was suppressed in Korea, and the only source of MA instruction open to Koreans was in Japan. The Kwan founders, returning from Japan with their new dan ranks and technical knowledge, were unable to promote a robust instructional program in the karate they had learned until the end of the war—at which time the military, particularly driven by Gen. Choi's personal vision of an official army style for battlefield use, and an increasing nationalistic need to purge the KMAs of their Japanese legacy, in effect took control over the organization and development of the MAs in Korea.
The crucial cultural attitude that made this possible, I've been thinking, is the lack of an identification, in Koreans' thinking, between MAs on the one hand and family traditions on the other. The modern KMAs were introduced virtually out of nowhere; they were not rooted in an extant historical tradition of generation-to-generation transmission, with special technical secrets and training methods jealously protected within (at least extended) familiers. There was therefore no inherent sense of personal ownership, so to speak, which would have made KMAists resist the military's demand for a `product' that could be widely taught, quickly and effectively, to their active troops. From day one, then, the KMAs were vulnerable to the sort of imposed monolithic technical content that's such a very visible component of the way the KMA organizations have developed for the past half century.
So that's the bare bones of what I've been thinking... a correlation between the crucial absence of the family transmission model (or a close analogue) in the modern KMAs, on the one hand, and the heavily top-down, forced unification model of the MAs in Korea (as vs. anywhere else in Asia that I know of) on the other. Anyone have any thoughts on this idea?

Looking at the interview that Iceman posted a link to, there are some very interesting specific points relevant to TKD's history (Gm. Won Kuk Lee believes `that there is an overemphasis on kicking techniques at most schools', that there is virtually no documentary history for modern KMAs before the turn of the 20th c. (`There is no record of exactly who did what and when over the 2,000 year process. Literature on the specifics of development of Tae Kwondo is rare until modem times.'), and specifically that Tae Kyon, whatever it may have been, was essentially extinct three or four generations before Gm. Lee and his compatriots began to learn martial arts). The Gm.'s observation tie in, overall, very nicely with the massive documentary evidence supplied by Dakin Burdick (`People and events of Taekwando's Formative Years', Journal of Asian Martial Arts 6:1 (1997); see also the later, slightly different version at http://www.budosportcapelle.nl/gesch.html), Stanley Henning (Henning, S. `Traditional Korean martial arts' Journal of Asian Martial Arts 9:1 (2000)), Manuel AdroguĂ© (`Ancient military manuals and their relation to modern Korean martial arts', Journal of Asian Martial Arts 12:4 (2003)) and Steve Capener (`Problems in the identity and philosophy of Taegwondo and their historical causes', http://www.bigskytaekwondo.com/Resources/Capener.htm) for the very recent emergence of the Korean MAs on the almost exclusive base of Japanese karate (though there may be some influence from Chinese chuan fa as well), with hints here and there through what little documentation exists for the very strongly Chinese influence over Korean MAs at earlier phases, going back to the Three Kingdoms perior; a nicely balanced picture is given in the Wikipedia article on KMAs at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_martial_arts. But what most struck me about the interview with Gm. Lee—founder of the Chung Do Kwan arguably the oldest (viable) of the original Kwans and almost certainly the most influential and dominant during the Kwan era—was his constant insistence on the need for unity, and his criticism of others—including, from his tone, his own students—for what he calls the `fragmentation' of TKD:
I believe that fragmentation of Tae Kwon Do into many kwans is ultimately harmful. I would prefer unification of kwans and techniques. Improvement of technical quality requires strict practice. Without special training, there can never be improvement of the quality of martial arts. I therefore recommend strong education. I hope to see a strong educational organization dedicated to this sort of improvement of techniques. It is my earnest hope that a Tae Kwon Do college will be established one day. Such a college would promote deep training and technical development.
The military, especially as represented by Gen. Choi, may have played a important role in imposing the kind of enforced unification that Gm. Lee seems to believe to be such a good thing, but there is no question that, with a few very notable exceptions such as Hwang Kee, the culture of Korean MA from the end of the war on has been entirely compatible with this regimentation. I've never been able to figure out exactly why that should be the case, though I've suspected for a long time that it had somethingn to do with the very recent origins of the modern KMAs....
But in thinking about the Okinawan karate thread (again, http://www.martialtalk.com/forum/showthread.php?t=52402]), it suddenly occurred to me that of all the Asian MAs, those of Korea are unique in the sense that they did not originate, and propagate, within families over a long period of time. The incredibly fine-grained complexity of the CMAs is due to their origins in particular family lineages, and the Okinawan thread echoes this family-based granularity, though obviously on a much smaller scale. In Japan, there are MAs (such as traditional, `castle-era' ninjutsu) which appear to have been propagated as specific family traditions, and while it's true that the budo arts are not so obviously rooted in particular family lines, the deep lineage of individual schools of swordsmanship provides a comparable `locality' for the transmission of techniques and martial secrets over generations. But, if the model of Korean MA history laid out in the detailed historical studies I've cited above (among others) is correct, the modern KMAs were not transmitted in this fashion. They were, instead, grafted into Korean culture in a remarkably short time: the Japanese occupation suppressed whatever indigenous arts were extant at the time—about which we have essentially no reliable information—substituting instruction in jiujitsu and kendo, as Burdick documents; subsequents instruction in even these arts was suppressed in Korea, and the only source of MA instruction open to Koreans was in Japan. The Kwan founders, returning from Japan with their new dan ranks and technical knowledge, were unable to promote a robust instructional program in the karate they had learned until the end of the war—at which time the military, particularly driven by Gen. Choi's personal vision of an official army style for battlefield use, and an increasing nationalistic need to purge the KMAs of their Japanese legacy, in effect took control over the organization and development of the MAs in Korea.
The crucial cultural attitude that made this possible, I've been thinking, is the lack of an identification, in Koreans' thinking, between MAs on the one hand and family traditions on the other. The modern KMAs were introduced virtually out of nowhere; they were not rooted in an extant historical tradition of generation-to-generation transmission, with special technical secrets and training methods jealously protected within (at least extended) familiers. There was therefore no inherent sense of personal ownership, so to speak, which would have made KMAists resist the military's demand for a `product' that could be widely taught, quickly and effectively, to their active troops. From day one, then, the KMAs were vulnerable to the sort of imposed monolithic technical content that's such a very visible component of the way the KMA organizations have developed for the past half century.
So that's the bare bones of what I've been thinking... a correlation between the crucial absence of the family transmission model (or a close analogue) in the modern KMAs, on the one hand, and the heavily top-down, forced unification model of the MAs in Korea (as vs. anywhere else in Asia that I know of) on the other. Anyone have any thoughts on this idea?