A
AnimEdge
Guest
That was Einstein? i allways wondered who that wasRandomPhantom700 said:
Hmmm, What If? Very Scary!
- Thread starter Kane
- Start date
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rmcrobertson
Guest
Or to quote Joanna Russ', "The Female Man," a kick-*** book if ever there was one:
"How good of you to be an expert on things that never happened."
"How good of you to be an expert on things that never happened."
Dude, where did I say that fascism would modernize the world faster? I asked whether the axis rule would have modernize world FASTER OR SLOWER. Meaning I was nuetral on that for you guys to make a choice. Also, what is wrong with discussing "what if" scenarios? It's just like wondering who would win between a knight or samurai. There is nothing wrong with it.rmcrobertson said:
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rmcrobertson
Guest
Except, DUDE, for the glorification of horror.
How ya doin' with the Spinrad and the Dick books? There's also a pretty good L. Sprague de Camp story yawl should read...unless you're just plain into that one old "Star Trek," episode.
How ya doin' with the Spinrad and the Dick books? There's also a pretty good L. Sprague de Camp story yawl should read...unless you're just plain into that one old "Star Trek," episode.
You also act like only when extreme conservative fascists to modernize disasters happen. What about the extreme liberal communist of Stalin's Soviet Union? Under Stalin there was over 40-60 million deaths so that Russia can "modernize". That is more is between 6-10 times more than even Hitler. There was both to eat.
P
PeachMonkey
Guest
I apologize in advance for a long post.
This thread has brought up a number of interesting issues. Germany has always had, since nearly the beginning of the industrial revolution, a remarkable talent for innovation and production. However, for the sake of the original topic, I'll try and limit my comments to issues revolved around warfighting in the ETO during World War II -- in particular, technical, strategic, operational, and tactical issues.
Strategy:
---------
Strategically, Germany did not live up to her potential. The German General Staff tradition influenced every major combatant. In addition to training the bulk of German leadership, most of the finest leaders in the Soviet Army had access to German General Staff training. In fact, the key figure behind the reconstruction of the US Army after the attack at Pearl Harbor had studied in Germany, and used his professional staff training there as a model.
The professional tradition of this General Staff system served German units well at all levels during the conflict, but, with the exception of a number of innovative leaders, most of the Wehrmacht supreme command was bound by limited strategic creativity, whether due to the interference of Hitler's inane directives or their own hidebound traditions. Germany's victory in Poland came at a surprising level of difficulty; the Germans very nearly elected to repeat the disaster of the Schlieffen Plan rather than their attack through the Ardennes during the invasion of France; the choice to engage in Operation Barbarossa was disastrous, and the choice to divert resources away from its successes proved fatal; Rommel's brilliance in the field in North Africa was counterbalanced by tremendous blunders (failure to take Crete when it was possible, continous over-extension of gains) -- the list goes on and on. Oh, and there's the little matter of complete incompetence in the mobilization of industry... Germany's economy didn't even go to a formal wartime footing until 1943.
The Allies, on the other hand, have a better record in this area. The Soviets quickly realized their limitations, knew where to trade land for time and where to stand and fight, and were cynically able to trade massive numbers of men to achieve long-term strategic goals. The British responded to initial disasters in the field with superb focus, maintained air superiority over the Isles to prevent an invasion, and maintained complete sea supremacy, allowing them to continue the fight around the world. The United States recognized the importance of the Europe First strategy, demonstrated a complete mastery of economic mobilization, and worked inexorably to whittle away the gains of the Axis powers.
Tactics:
--------
Despite what some have suggested, the German army set the standard for tactical superiority. German units were trained, even until the end of the war, to maintain cohesion even under stress, and to apply the essentials of fire and movement at all levels. Time and time again, when faced with disaster on a strategic and operational level, German units were able to pull together and stop a total collapse -- accounts are profligate of HQ staffs, engineering units, clerks and typists, and even cooks grabbing weapons and forming firing lines to end overruns by superior forces. And, in nearly every case, German forces were unmatched in mobile warfare. Only elite units among the Allies (Airborne units, Rangers, Marines) matched or exceeded the standard level of tactical excellence amongst the Wehrmacht. Someone asserted that US units had a similar ability to "stick to the mission"... this simply wasn't true in either WWII or Korea, except among exceptional units such as Marines or the Airborne. This deficiency was seen time and time again, from the Kasserine Pass through the Second Battle of the Ardennes Forest (Bulge). Only after these conflicts, when the US military focused heavily on the lessons learned and invested heavily in doctrine and training, was this deficiency addressed.
Operational:
------------
The Germans were the inventors of the term operativ, a word that doesn't translate well into English -- the concept lies somewhere between grand strategy and small-unit tactics, and encompasses the ability of leaders to respond to the unknowable changes and flows in the battlefield.
Ironically, their application of this ability was mixed; some leaders were masters, others less so. The insistence of Hitler and the OKW to interfere on unit-by-unit levels during critical moments of the war overrode any operational abilities held by many leaders -- other masters of the operational art were dismissed by Hitler at various points in the conflict simply for disagreeing with his insanity.
In addition, some crucial Allied forces brought their own levels of expertise here, among them Patton, Bradley, to a lesser extent Montgomery, and many, many of the Soviet leaders from later in the war. Eisenhower showed no great gifts in this arena, as his leadership during Torch shows, but he made up for this in his role as SAC and in his selection of subordinates.
Just as an aside, Robert, most of the examples you quote about beating the best Germany had against odds were not totally accurate. The Rangers were facing horrible odds at Omaha Beach, but they were the finest of the elite of the US military, and the problems were of terrain and firepower -- the German forces on the beaches were primarily second and third-rate units, selected to hold the fortifications due to their lack of mobility, stamina, and-or training. The 101st at Bastogne were, again, an elite unit -- not much more to say about that act of heroism. Patton never commanded Second Army, but rather II Corps, whose successes in North Africa were against high-quality Afrikakorps units that were suffering from extreme deficiencies in supply and total Allied air supremacy. Patton went on to command Third Army, which, again, leveraged his excellent leadership and well-supplied US units with total air supremacy against savavely depleted German units in Operation Cobra.
Technical:
----------
The German army had a mixture of technical innovation and fetishism.
German infantry units used some of the best small-arms of the war, and innovated in ways that still apply today, such as the development of the assault rifle.
German tanks were a mixed bag. Germany's early successes in armored warfare actually came against superior tanks, whether those of the Poles, the French, or British. Leadership, organization, tactics, and communication were the keys to German armored prowess.
The inferiority of German tank design, especially to the Soviet T34, led to the highly vaunted Panther and Tiger series, as well as some truly insane experiments such as the Maus. While Panthers and Tigers outgunned and outarmored the vast majority of their opponents, they faced a serious number of deficiencies. They were insanely complex to develop, build, and maintain. Delays in the development of the Panther delayed Operation Citadel and contributed massively to its subsequent failure at Kursk. These tanks were notoriously unreliable, so nonstandard from tank-to-tank as to make maintenance a nightmare, and desperately vulnerable to combined-arms tactics with infantry (especially in the case of the Tigers). They also lacked mobility, dramatically limiting their utility, and leaving them vulnerable in open battle to more nimble Allied weaponry.
The greatest successes of the Tigers and Panthers were psychological (due to their size, powerful guns, and thick armor), or of limited applicability -- the hedgerows of Normandy balanced the mobility scales and made them kings of the battlefield, but in the open fields and steppes they were quite vulnerable. The Sherman-to-Tiger ratio was primarily skewed by the early static battles in Normandy. In more mobile battles, particularly with upgunned Shermans, they gave a far better accounting of themselves.
(By the way, similarities between the M1 and the Tiger are mainly superficial. Yes, both have dominant guns and incredibly protective front armor. However, the M1 also learned from all the failures of the Tiger... it is extremely mobile, has a reduced profile, is capable against infantry, and is designed for extreme ease of maintenance.)
Shermans were more weakly armored, couldn't penetrate many more advanced tanks with their gun, and caught fire easily, but they were mobile, reliable, maintainable -- a well-balanced infantry tank. The finest tank of the war, from this same perspective of balance, was the above-mentioned T34.
Another quick example: German U-Boats were garbage, especially compared to the submarines of the US. Their threat mainly came from leadership and innovative tactics, but even their strategic threat has been shown post-war to have been exaggerated -- I refer you to the excellent, and definitive, two-part volume "Hitler's U-Boat War" by Clay Blair.
I won't even get into aircraft, mainly because I'm tired. Again, while the Germans showed flashes of brilliance throughout the war, and their pilots were often superb, their aircraft were usually outclassed by Allied planes and their strategic air planning was pathetic.
Conclusion:
-----------
The German military was highly influential both before and after WWII due to innovations in command, leadership, and technology. Many of these areas had extreme deficiencies as well, and in many cases, common beliefs about supposed German or Allied advantages don't hold up to scrutiny.
The war was always unwinnable for Germany, due to a mixture of economic and strategic issues that haven't really even been addressed; it's not fair to say the Allies won simply because of economics, nor is it accurate to say that many standard beliefs about German quality were mythical.
This thread has brought up a number of interesting issues. Germany has always had, since nearly the beginning of the industrial revolution, a remarkable talent for innovation and production. However, for the sake of the original topic, I'll try and limit my comments to issues revolved around warfighting in the ETO during World War II -- in particular, technical, strategic, operational, and tactical issues.
Strategy:
---------
Strategically, Germany did not live up to her potential. The German General Staff tradition influenced every major combatant. In addition to training the bulk of German leadership, most of the finest leaders in the Soviet Army had access to German General Staff training. In fact, the key figure behind the reconstruction of the US Army after the attack at Pearl Harbor had studied in Germany, and used his professional staff training there as a model.
The professional tradition of this General Staff system served German units well at all levels during the conflict, but, with the exception of a number of innovative leaders, most of the Wehrmacht supreme command was bound by limited strategic creativity, whether due to the interference of Hitler's inane directives or their own hidebound traditions. Germany's victory in Poland came at a surprising level of difficulty; the Germans very nearly elected to repeat the disaster of the Schlieffen Plan rather than their attack through the Ardennes during the invasion of France; the choice to engage in Operation Barbarossa was disastrous, and the choice to divert resources away from its successes proved fatal; Rommel's brilliance in the field in North Africa was counterbalanced by tremendous blunders (failure to take Crete when it was possible, continous over-extension of gains) -- the list goes on and on. Oh, and there's the little matter of complete incompetence in the mobilization of industry... Germany's economy didn't even go to a formal wartime footing until 1943.
The Allies, on the other hand, have a better record in this area. The Soviets quickly realized their limitations, knew where to trade land for time and where to stand and fight, and were cynically able to trade massive numbers of men to achieve long-term strategic goals. The British responded to initial disasters in the field with superb focus, maintained air superiority over the Isles to prevent an invasion, and maintained complete sea supremacy, allowing them to continue the fight around the world. The United States recognized the importance of the Europe First strategy, demonstrated a complete mastery of economic mobilization, and worked inexorably to whittle away the gains of the Axis powers.
Tactics:
--------
Despite what some have suggested, the German army set the standard for tactical superiority. German units were trained, even until the end of the war, to maintain cohesion even under stress, and to apply the essentials of fire and movement at all levels. Time and time again, when faced with disaster on a strategic and operational level, German units were able to pull together and stop a total collapse -- accounts are profligate of HQ staffs, engineering units, clerks and typists, and even cooks grabbing weapons and forming firing lines to end overruns by superior forces. And, in nearly every case, German forces were unmatched in mobile warfare. Only elite units among the Allies (Airborne units, Rangers, Marines) matched or exceeded the standard level of tactical excellence amongst the Wehrmacht. Someone asserted that US units had a similar ability to "stick to the mission"... this simply wasn't true in either WWII or Korea, except among exceptional units such as Marines or the Airborne. This deficiency was seen time and time again, from the Kasserine Pass through the Second Battle of the Ardennes Forest (Bulge). Only after these conflicts, when the US military focused heavily on the lessons learned and invested heavily in doctrine and training, was this deficiency addressed.
Operational:
------------
The Germans were the inventors of the term operativ, a word that doesn't translate well into English -- the concept lies somewhere between grand strategy and small-unit tactics, and encompasses the ability of leaders to respond to the unknowable changes and flows in the battlefield.
Ironically, their application of this ability was mixed; some leaders were masters, others less so. The insistence of Hitler and the OKW to interfere on unit-by-unit levels during critical moments of the war overrode any operational abilities held by many leaders -- other masters of the operational art were dismissed by Hitler at various points in the conflict simply for disagreeing with his insanity.
In addition, some crucial Allied forces brought their own levels of expertise here, among them Patton, Bradley, to a lesser extent Montgomery, and many, many of the Soviet leaders from later in the war. Eisenhower showed no great gifts in this arena, as his leadership during Torch shows, but he made up for this in his role as SAC and in his selection of subordinates.
Just as an aside, Robert, most of the examples you quote about beating the best Germany had against odds were not totally accurate. The Rangers were facing horrible odds at Omaha Beach, but they were the finest of the elite of the US military, and the problems were of terrain and firepower -- the German forces on the beaches were primarily second and third-rate units, selected to hold the fortifications due to their lack of mobility, stamina, and-or training. The 101st at Bastogne were, again, an elite unit -- not much more to say about that act of heroism. Patton never commanded Second Army, but rather II Corps, whose successes in North Africa were against high-quality Afrikakorps units that were suffering from extreme deficiencies in supply and total Allied air supremacy. Patton went on to command Third Army, which, again, leveraged his excellent leadership and well-supplied US units with total air supremacy against savavely depleted German units in Operation Cobra.
Technical:
----------
The German army had a mixture of technical innovation and fetishism.
German infantry units used some of the best small-arms of the war, and innovated in ways that still apply today, such as the development of the assault rifle.
German tanks were a mixed bag. Germany's early successes in armored warfare actually came against superior tanks, whether those of the Poles, the French, or British. Leadership, organization, tactics, and communication were the keys to German armored prowess.
The inferiority of German tank design, especially to the Soviet T34, led to the highly vaunted Panther and Tiger series, as well as some truly insane experiments such as the Maus. While Panthers and Tigers outgunned and outarmored the vast majority of their opponents, they faced a serious number of deficiencies. They were insanely complex to develop, build, and maintain. Delays in the development of the Panther delayed Operation Citadel and contributed massively to its subsequent failure at Kursk. These tanks were notoriously unreliable, so nonstandard from tank-to-tank as to make maintenance a nightmare, and desperately vulnerable to combined-arms tactics with infantry (especially in the case of the Tigers). They also lacked mobility, dramatically limiting their utility, and leaving them vulnerable in open battle to more nimble Allied weaponry.
The greatest successes of the Tigers and Panthers were psychological (due to their size, powerful guns, and thick armor), or of limited applicability -- the hedgerows of Normandy balanced the mobility scales and made them kings of the battlefield, but in the open fields and steppes they were quite vulnerable. The Sherman-to-Tiger ratio was primarily skewed by the early static battles in Normandy. In more mobile battles, particularly with upgunned Shermans, they gave a far better accounting of themselves.
(By the way, similarities between the M1 and the Tiger are mainly superficial. Yes, both have dominant guns and incredibly protective front armor. However, the M1 also learned from all the failures of the Tiger... it is extremely mobile, has a reduced profile, is capable against infantry, and is designed for extreme ease of maintenance.)
Shermans were more weakly armored, couldn't penetrate many more advanced tanks with their gun, and caught fire easily, but they were mobile, reliable, maintainable -- a well-balanced infantry tank. The finest tank of the war, from this same perspective of balance, was the above-mentioned T34.
Another quick example: German U-Boats were garbage, especially compared to the submarines of the US. Their threat mainly came from leadership and innovative tactics, but even their strategic threat has been shown post-war to have been exaggerated -- I refer you to the excellent, and definitive, two-part volume "Hitler's U-Boat War" by Clay Blair.
I won't even get into aircraft, mainly because I'm tired. Again, while the Germans showed flashes of brilliance throughout the war, and their pilots were often superb, their aircraft were usually outclassed by Allied planes and their strategic air planning was pathetic.
Conclusion:
-----------
The German military was highly influential both before and after WWII due to innovations in command, leadership, and technology. Many of these areas had extreme deficiencies as well, and in many cases, common beliefs about supposed German or Allied advantages don't hold up to scrutiny.
The war was always unwinnable for Germany, due to a mixture of economic and strategic issues that haven't really even been addressed; it's not fair to say the Allies won simply because of economics, nor is it accurate to say that many standard beliefs about German quality were mythical.
P
PeachMonkey
Guest
By what facts or standards do you place the autarchical dictatorship of the Soviet Union as having been "liberal"? Thanks.Kane said:
I'm not trying to label anyone. It just seems rmcrobertson thinks that only super extreme conservatives (fascists for example) are the only extreme evil. If both sides get to their extreme it is bad. There always has to be a balance. Super Extreme liberalism is bad too. Stalin is and example of Super Extreme Liberal and Hitler is and example of Super Extreme Conservative. Both are bad if they get to their extreme point.PeachMonkey said:
Why was Stalin Extreme Liberal? He believed all humans around him were at the same level as animals making it okay to kill anyone. He killed many for no reason. Also, Communist Dictatorship is also defined at the very edge of extreme linearism.
Why was Hitler Extreme Conservative? Simple, he was ultra-nationalist and ultra-racist. He killed any who wasn't in the same race. Also, Autocracy Dictatorship can be defined to be at the very edge of extreme conservatism.
michaeledward
Grandmaster
I always liked that Star Trek episode ... it was one actually written by the Great Bird, himself.rmcrobertson said:
"Wheat Pleb Neesta" ---- at least that's the way I always heard it.
:lasma:
we really need some Star Trek smileys
P
PeachMonkey
Guest
Kane said:
I didn't say you were; I just dispute placing Stalin as an "extreme liberal".
I invite you to look at the definition of the word "liberal":
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=liberal
...and compare this to Stalin's regime.
Even if you associate the formation of a Marxist/Leninist state as the "ideal result for liberals" (which is also inaccurate), you have to remember that Stalin's regime was a *betrayal* of the ideals of Lenin, Trotsky, et al.
Kane said:
What does "extreme linearism" mean? I really have not heard that term before in this context.
Also, is it your implication that liberalism, taken to an extreme, makes it okay to kill anyone? On what basis do you make that statement?
I didn't use the word "autocracy", I used the work "autarky".Kane said:
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=autarky
PM - Thank you for that excellet analysis. 
ME - I'll hunt for some
ME - I'll hunt for some
Tgace
Grandmaster
rmcrobertson said:
Robert, unfortunatley, many new medical and other science came out of this war as well on the Axis and the Allieds side. Yes there were horrors that were committed and that should not be forgotten, yet people in the Renaisance period carved up dead bodies from sactified graves, yes crimes against the dead are not the same as those against the living, yet, there was progress made.
It also forced others to move faster in their development.
rmcrobertson said:
Yes, by the end of the War, the German Tanks were not the best. Yet if they had taken out one country at a time and then used minimal tropps to maintain control those tanks could have be used before the others developed better technologies.
Note: The USA also had better airplanes by the end of the war. Yet, we did not start out that way.
rmcrobertson said:
First off, I do not like terms such as Jerry, or Charlie, or Jap, or Nip, or Sand N, or N, or Towel Head, or, ..., . They are signs of a weak mind that insists upon racism and nationalism. I would have expected better of you Robert.
Yes, the British had them about the same time? In the big picture of history the whole war was about the same time. Was it a year, or monthes or days?
This also goes back to the tank isue, and resources, (* Note The Japanese also had resource issues in Asia, and actually was there reason for going into China *) where the Germans could not maintain a good supply chain of resources. The fact that they could not control the Med and have the resources from Africa did hurt them. They moved to fast.
rmcrobertson said:
Yes, American, with the German influence in research. The Germans and the US were the two big deveolper of this type of science. Today, you Russians, Germans and the US are the main forces of development in Chemistry and Physics. Yes, the Asians have it also, yet they are not developing new technologies or research, only looking to cach up to the three I mentioned.
rmcrobertson said:
Yes, we kicked there ***. It was the last great war where every felt great about going and killing a bunch of people. All the wars since then, have not had that feeling or the support of the US people.
I also agree that the Men and Women in the Military made a big difference. Patton being able to go places others had problems to go. Using Pattan as a decoy in Turkey for the Normandy Landing, was brilliant tactical planning. Yes he was also being punished for slapping a man. But, the Axis could not believe that would be enough to stop the man and his leadership. As Tom G mentioned the capability of teams to move forward based upon immediate information was also important.
rmcrobertson said:
Yes, The Russians out smarted the Germans here. And this was one were Fuel was not the major deciding factor. Kursk was good fighting by the Russians, if you can say fighting is good fighting.
rmcrobertson said:
As to being old fashioned, not a problem.
As to being sick of being PC and giving credit, I can understand it. Yet, in my mind if I understand them better maybe I can avoid it in the future, or understand what drove them to that place in the first place. You are intitled to your opinion.
As to the Democratic armies, The Republic of Rome, which the US is also a Republic, lost to the invading Huns, the barbarians of the north, the, ..., .
And I find it hard to swallow you saying that Capitalism is good for anything. Just not what I expected. I learned a little bit more today.
rmcrobertson said:
I don't know if we would have. If they had the bomb first. If the isolation kept us out until only the American continents were free, then could we have faught them back? I do not know.
Tgace
Grandmaster
I remember reading a WWII history book (Ambriose??) that mentioned an advantage the US had was good ole farmboy fix em' up attitude. The tankers developing and welding plows "on the fly" onto their machines to go through the Norman hedgerows, fixing up broken vehicles on the road instead of leaving them for follow up mechanics and being able to drive almost anything (American love of vehicles). Small skills and abilities that magnified their military capacity.
R
rmcrobertson
Guest
Dear, DEAR "Kane," (hey, how's that Abel doin'?) how good of you to read my mind. What was in there? I'm never sure. Listen up, genius: I know more about the ills of the Left and its occasional autarchs than you do. That's why I quote things such as the Situationists', "The world won't be happy 'till the last capitalist is hung with the guts of the last bureaucrat." Wanna guess who they had in mind by "bureaucrats?"
I realize that you're trapped in some weird ultra-right ideology that can only survive on the fantasy that nobody else but Rush knows nothin' bout no Gulag, but Sparky, I was--quite literally, I'll bet--reading Solzhenitsyn before you were born. That's "Aleksander." "Solzenitsyn." Author of, "Gulag Archipelago?" "Cancer Ward?" No, eh?
Hey, wanna flip out your buddies? read about the career of Louis Althusser, find out where Pol Pot studied, and then you'll have some real ammo, rather than the intellectual popguns. But you didn't hear it from me; I was busy advancing the righteous struggle of the Second Comintern.
Oh and hey DUDE, re-read the part of "Starship Troopers," where Mr. Dubois goes after the notion that body count matters, in ways that interact interestingly with Dylan Thomas' "After the first death, there is no other," and old Joe's own, "One death is a tragedy, a million is a statistic." Get a load of the body count of Native Americans that occurred as a direct result of capitalism in its early colonialist period. Three smacks with a copy of "Slaughterhouse-Five; or, the Children's Crusade." Or, hell, since we're in on WWII, go read Hersey's, "Hiroshima," and then come back and lecture on Stalin. Or hell, contemplate the year-and-a-half old baby girl, killed by F-111s sent to assassinate Quaddafi...and then go back to Heinlein: "The Regiment was disgraced and we FELT disgraced...we were supposed to protect baby girls, not murder them...."
Incidentally, Stephen Ambrose--well known for his moral lectures--got caight plagiarizing his books a couple years back. Just like Doris Kearns Goodwin, reagan's biographer, got caught.
Oh, I forgot..."Nazis," is far worse than "Jerry," especially for the many members of the German-American Bund in this country during the War. And their allies, like Lindbergh. Might as well complain about calling KKK members sheet-heads...
I realize that you're trapped in some weird ultra-right ideology that can only survive on the fantasy that nobody else but Rush knows nothin' bout no Gulag, but Sparky, I was--quite literally, I'll bet--reading Solzhenitsyn before you were born. That's "Aleksander." "Solzenitsyn." Author of, "Gulag Archipelago?" "Cancer Ward?" No, eh?
Hey, wanna flip out your buddies? read about the career of Louis Althusser, find out where Pol Pot studied, and then you'll have some real ammo, rather than the intellectual popguns. But you didn't hear it from me; I was busy advancing the righteous struggle of the Second Comintern.
Oh and hey DUDE, re-read the part of "Starship Troopers," where Mr. Dubois goes after the notion that body count matters, in ways that interact interestingly with Dylan Thomas' "After the first death, there is no other," and old Joe's own, "One death is a tragedy, a million is a statistic." Get a load of the body count of Native Americans that occurred as a direct result of capitalism in its early colonialist period. Three smacks with a copy of "Slaughterhouse-Five; or, the Children's Crusade." Or, hell, since we're in on WWII, go read Hersey's, "Hiroshima," and then come back and lecture on Stalin. Or hell, contemplate the year-and-a-half old baby girl, killed by F-111s sent to assassinate Quaddafi...and then go back to Heinlein: "The Regiment was disgraced and we FELT disgraced...we were supposed to protect baby girls, not murder them...."
Incidentally, Stephen Ambrose--well known for his moral lectures--got caight plagiarizing his books a couple years back. Just like Doris Kearns Goodwin, reagan's biographer, got caught.
Oh, I forgot..."Nazis," is far worse than "Jerry," especially for the many members of the German-American Bund in this country during the War. And their allies, like Lindbergh. Might as well complain about calling KKK members sheet-heads...
R
rmcrobertson
Guest
If'n yer gonna cite Amborse as a moral authority, then his ability to act as a moral authority becomes an issue. Further, ad hominem attacks usually involve somebody's private life, not the nature of their public, professional conduct. I referred to his published work, and his getting caught cheating in public.
After all, this IS precisely the excuse Bush et al are using to attack John Kerry's war record, since they cannot compare his record to the President's.
After all, this IS precisely the excuse Bush et al are using to attack John Kerry's war record, since they cannot compare his record to the President's.
Tgace
Grandmaster
Ad Hominem (Argument To The Man):
attacking the person instead of attacking his argument. For example, "Von Daniken's books about ancient astronauts are worthless because he is a convicted forger and embezzler." (Which is true, but that's not why they're worthless.)
Another example is this syllogism, which alludes to Alan Turing's homosexuality:
Turing thinks machines think.
Turing lies with men.
Therefore, machines don't think.
(Note the equivocation in the use of the word "lies".)
A common form is an attack on sincerity. For example, "How can you argue for vegetarianism when you wear leather shoes?" The two wrongs make a right fallacy is related.
A variation (related to Argument By Generalization) is to attack a whole class of people. For example, "Evolutionary biology is a sinister tool of the materialistic, atheistic religion of Secular Humanism." Similarly, one notorious net.kook waved away a whole category of evidence by announcing "All the scientists were drunk."
Another variation is attack by innuendo: "Why don't scientists tell us what they really know; are they afraid of public panic?"
There may be a pretense that the attack isn't happening: "In order to maintain a civil debate, I will not mention my opponent's drinking problem."
Sometimes the attack is on intelligence. For example, "If you weren't so stupid you would have no problem seeing my point of view." Or, dismissing a comment with "Well, you're just smarter than the rest of us." (In Britain, that might be put as "too clever by half".) This is related to Not Invented Here, but perhaps it is more connected to Dismissal By Differentness and Changing The Subject.
Ad Hominem is not fallacious if the attack goes to the credibility of the argument. For instance, the argument may depend on its presenter's claim that he's an expert. (That is, there is an Argument From Authority.) Trial judges allow this category of attacks.
attacking the person instead of attacking his argument. For example, "Von Daniken's books about ancient astronauts are worthless because he is a convicted forger and embezzler." (Which is true, but that's not why they're worthless.)
Another example is this syllogism, which alludes to Alan Turing's homosexuality:
Turing thinks machines think.
Turing lies with men.
Therefore, machines don't think.
(Note the equivocation in the use of the word "lies".)
A common form is an attack on sincerity. For example, "How can you argue for vegetarianism when you wear leather shoes?" The two wrongs make a right fallacy is related.
A variation (related to Argument By Generalization) is to attack a whole class of people. For example, "Evolutionary biology is a sinister tool of the materialistic, atheistic religion of Secular Humanism." Similarly, one notorious net.kook waved away a whole category of evidence by announcing "All the scientists were drunk."
Another variation is attack by innuendo: "Why don't scientists tell us what they really know; are they afraid of public panic?"
There may be a pretense that the attack isn't happening: "In order to maintain a civil debate, I will not mention my opponent's drinking problem."
Sometimes the attack is on intelligence. For example, "If you weren't so stupid you would have no problem seeing my point of view." Or, dismissing a comment with "Well, you're just smarter than the rest of us." (In Britain, that might be put as "too clever by half".) This is related to Not Invented Here, but perhaps it is more connected to Dismissal By Differentness and Changing The Subject.
Ad Hominem is not fallacious if the attack goes to the credibility of the argument. For instance, the argument may depend on its presenter's claim that he's an expert. (That is, there is an Argument From Authority.) Trial judges allow this category of attacks.
R
rmcrobertson
Guest
"Ad Hominem is not fallacious if the attack goes to the credibility of the argument."
I see that we agree. Excellent, Simpson.
I see that we agree. Excellent, Simpson.
