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In the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the Intelligence Community (IC) reported to the President and Congress that although Saddam did not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, that he remained intent on acquiring them. The NIE claimed that, "most agencies assess that Baghdad started reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM inspectors depart - December 1998." The report concluded that the speed with which Iraq could obtain its first nuclear weapon would depend on when it acquired sufficient weapons-grade fissile material: if Baghdad acquired sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a year. Without such material from abroad, NIE stated that Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.
This conclusion, though presented as the opinion of the Intelligence Community, was not shared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR). INR stated that it believed that although Saddam still desired nucelar weapons and pursued at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities, the evidence at hand was not enough to conclude that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. Specifically, INR disagreeded with CIA and DIA regarding the nature of aluminum tubes procured by Iraq.
As seen Here
Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to CW production. The best examples are the chlorine and phenol plants at the Fallujah II facility. Both chemicals have legitimate civilian uses but also are raw materials for the synthesis of precursor chemicals used to produce blister and nerve agents. Iraq has three other chlorine plants that have much higher capacity for civilian production; these plants and Iraqi imports are more than sufficient to meet Iraq's civilian needs for water treatment. Of the 15 million kg of chlorine imported under the UN Oil-for-Food Program since 1997, Baghdad used only 10 million kg and has 5 million kg in stock, suggesting that some domestically produced chlorine has been diverted to such proscribed activities as CW agent production.
- Iraq probably has concealed precursors, production equipment, documentation, and other items necessary for continuing its CW effort. Baghdad never supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions. Thousands of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud-variant missile warheads, remain unaccounted for.
- UNSCOM discovered a document at Iraqi Air Force headquarters in July 1998 showing that Iraq overstated by at least 6,000 the number of chemical bombs it told the UN it had used during the Iran-Iraq Warbombs that remain are unaccounted for.
- Iraq has not accounted for 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred means for delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent.
- Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents.
As seen Here in October, 2002. This was the sum extent of intel on Iraq's possible WMD programs. Note that will and intent do not make a "program." It's likely that Saddam was dreaming of having a program again, being evasive, but not doing a damn thing to make the weapons that were never found. And, CIA was aware of the thinness of their intel, and noted it to the parties involved: Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Rice and BuS. Indeed, Powell refused to carry on the story of "acquiring yellowcake uranium from Niger,"in his U.N. presentation because he was aware of how thin and questionable it was.