Vice President Dick Cheney recently charged (though well before his hunting accident) that those who raise questions concerning the president’s truth telling are “reprehensible,” “corrupt” and “shameless.” Cheney says that to claim presidential lying in the buildup to the Iraq war is to rewrite history.
Until recently, I’ve refrained from calling our President a liar, or saying that he lied. That’s no longer the case.
As a matter of law, we can bring an action when, in a business deal, someone pretends to know something as true when in fact he or she does not know whether it was true. According to the law, that is, lying is more than just consciously telling a falsehood; lying is also positively asserting as true something you do not really know. If you’re not sure but you intend the other fellow to swallow your facts and depend upon them, that is fraud.
With this as a principle, if I had this case to bring before a jury (and I’m not a lawyer, but maybe an e-Budo lawyer could support me on this-others have already), I would charge George Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld with having made prewar statements to Congress that they asserted as true but that they knew either were not true or might not be true. I would say, further, that they made these statements with the intent to mislead Congress and that these acts are covered under Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 371, which makes it a crime to interfere with or impede the war-making powers of Congress.
One could begin with the most obvious. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in the buildup to war: “We know where the weapons of mass destruction are. They are north, south, east and west.” I would tell a jury, to the contrary, that Rumsfeld did not know. He knew that he was guessing. He did not tell the American people about the doubts that had been raised by his own defense intelligence advisors within the Pentagon. He asserted as true a fact that he had been advised was not at all certain and did so with the purpose to intentionally mislead the American people and Congress.
During this same time frame, Vice President Cheney told audiences without equivocation that Saddam Hussein was renewing his weapons programs. Cheney knew that his sources were uncertain; he did not, however, reveal these uncertainties. Instead, he told the people, intending that Congress hear and be influenced, that the new weapons program was unequivocally true. Mr. Cheney did not tell Congress that he had motives of his own for invading Iraq — that his energy task force had secretly been poring over maps of oil resources in Iraq since early 2001, well before 9/11. He did not tell Congress that he intended, once the war began, to provide no-bid, billion-dollar contracts to Halliburton, his former employer. He did not, that is, reveal facts that suggest a strong motive for intentional misrepresentation, which is the legal term for lying, and lying to Congress is, again, a crime under Section 371.
Rumsfeld and Cheney are two, and that is enough under Section 371 to prove a conspiracy. But what about a third? What about the president? In the winter of 2003, he solemnly proclaimed to Congress that he “had not made up his mind” whether to invade Iraq, a statement intended to induce Congress to believe that he would continue to review the facts with them.
But there is substantial evidence that Mr. Bush had no doubt whatsoever. Nine months earlier, in May 2002, he had ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare battle plans for the invasion of Iraq. In June, he declared a policy authorizing preemptive war, allowing himself to choose war against any country he considered dangerous. In June/July he shifted $700 million from Afghanistan to operations in Iraq. In July he indicated to the British prime minister that it was only a matter of time until the United States invaded Iraq; his staff even explained to the British that intelligence providing justification for war would be shaped to make the case. In the autumn, he orchestrated a public-relations campaign repeatedly warning Congress against an Iraqi mushroom cloud, although in October the CIA had told him that such an event was unlikely. In October, he told Congress that his facts were sure and that they should rely upon him.
Mr. Bush had been carefully planning war against Iraq throughout 2002. His denials of any such intention misled Congress into believing that it would be asked to support war only if Saddam Hussein did not cooperate or upon facts yet to be determined. In fact, as the above recitation makes clear, the president’s decision seems to have been made many months before, and nothing Hussein might have done would have changed that decision. The effect of presidential assertions to the contrary was to delude Congress into believing that its opinion mattered and that its war-making powers were still relevant. Unknown to them, congressional intentions had been irrelevant for over a year.
In sum, Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld, during the course of 2002–2003, spoke and acted in ways that the law considers fraudulent. They were asserting as true facts that they either knew were not true or knew that they did not know the truth thereof. These misrepresentations were intended to, and did, interfere with Congress in the fair performance of its constitutional duty to declare and support war. An indictment, therefore, under 18 USC 371, charging a criminal conspiracy to throw Congress off track, intentionally impeding its rightful function, would appear to have a substantial legal and factual foundation.
Mr. Cheney says, with some heat, that to assert such a case is shameful. To some it will appear, however, that to not assert such a case is to abandon the rule of law and that that course is even more shameful.
Until recently, I’ve refrained from calling our President a liar, or saying that he lied. That’s no longer the case.
As a matter of law, we can bring an action when, in a business deal, someone pretends to know something as true when in fact he or she does not know whether it was true. According to the law, that is, lying is more than just consciously telling a falsehood; lying is also positively asserting as true something you do not really know. If you’re not sure but you intend the other fellow to swallow your facts and depend upon them, that is fraud.
With this as a principle, if I had this case to bring before a jury (and I’m not a lawyer, but maybe an e-Budo lawyer could support me on this-others have already), I would charge George Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld with having made prewar statements to Congress that they asserted as true but that they knew either were not true or might not be true. I would say, further, that they made these statements with the intent to mislead Congress and that these acts are covered under Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 371, which makes it a crime to interfere with or impede the war-making powers of Congress.
One could begin with the most obvious. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in the buildup to war: “We know where the weapons of mass destruction are. They are north, south, east and west.” I would tell a jury, to the contrary, that Rumsfeld did not know. He knew that he was guessing. He did not tell the American people about the doubts that had been raised by his own defense intelligence advisors within the Pentagon. He asserted as true a fact that he had been advised was not at all certain and did so with the purpose to intentionally mislead the American people and Congress.
During this same time frame, Vice President Cheney told audiences without equivocation that Saddam Hussein was renewing his weapons programs. Cheney knew that his sources were uncertain; he did not, however, reveal these uncertainties. Instead, he told the people, intending that Congress hear and be influenced, that the new weapons program was unequivocally true. Mr. Cheney did not tell Congress that he had motives of his own for invading Iraq — that his energy task force had secretly been poring over maps of oil resources in Iraq since early 2001, well before 9/11. He did not tell Congress that he intended, once the war began, to provide no-bid, billion-dollar contracts to Halliburton, his former employer. He did not, that is, reveal facts that suggest a strong motive for intentional misrepresentation, which is the legal term for lying, and lying to Congress is, again, a crime under Section 371.
Rumsfeld and Cheney are two, and that is enough under Section 371 to prove a conspiracy. But what about a third? What about the president? In the winter of 2003, he solemnly proclaimed to Congress that he “had not made up his mind” whether to invade Iraq, a statement intended to induce Congress to believe that he would continue to review the facts with them.
But there is substantial evidence that Mr. Bush had no doubt whatsoever. Nine months earlier, in May 2002, he had ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare battle plans for the invasion of Iraq. In June, he declared a policy authorizing preemptive war, allowing himself to choose war against any country he considered dangerous. In June/July he shifted $700 million from Afghanistan to operations in Iraq. In July he indicated to the British prime minister that it was only a matter of time until the United States invaded Iraq; his staff even explained to the British that intelligence providing justification for war would be shaped to make the case. In the autumn, he orchestrated a public-relations campaign repeatedly warning Congress against an Iraqi mushroom cloud, although in October the CIA had told him that such an event was unlikely. In October, he told Congress that his facts were sure and that they should rely upon him.
Mr. Bush had been carefully planning war against Iraq throughout 2002. His denials of any such intention misled Congress into believing that it would be asked to support war only if Saddam Hussein did not cooperate or upon facts yet to be determined. In fact, as the above recitation makes clear, the president’s decision seems to have been made many months before, and nothing Hussein might have done would have changed that decision. The effect of presidential assertions to the contrary was to delude Congress into believing that its opinion mattered and that its war-making powers were still relevant. Unknown to them, congressional intentions had been irrelevant for over a year.
In sum, Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld, during the course of 2002–2003, spoke and acted in ways that the law considers fraudulent. They were asserting as true facts that they either knew were not true or knew that they did not know the truth thereof. These misrepresentations were intended to, and did, interfere with Congress in the fair performance of its constitutional duty to declare and support war. An indictment, therefore, under 18 USC 371, charging a criminal conspiracy to throw Congress off track, intentionally impeding its rightful function, would appear to have a substantial legal and factual foundation.
Mr. Cheney says, with some heat, that to assert such a case is shameful. To some it will appear, however, that to not assert such a case is to abandon the rule of law and that that course is even more shameful.
