The Evolution of Warfare

[Tgace]

Military minds who think about this stuff are saying that we are in the "4th generation" of warfare. The 1st being massed manpower a la 16th-19th century Warfare (Revolution, Napoleon, Civil War). The 2nd being massed firepower, like the machine gun swept, artillery pounded no-mans lands of WW1. The 3rd being manuver warfare starting with Blitzkreig right up to Gulf War 1. Now they are saying we are entering into a 4th generation where the huge disparity in military forces are forcing opponents to adopt new means. Most are saying that the insurgency and terrorist tactics are a manifistation of this change.

An interesting paper by the USMC addresses this...
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm

Tactically, fourth generation war will:

• Be fought in a complex arena of low-intensity conflict.
  
• Include tactics/techniques from earlier generations.
  
• Be fought across the spectrum of political, social, economic, and military networks.
  
• Be fought worldwide through these networks.
  
• Involve a mix of national, international, transnational, and subnational actors.
  

The strategic approach and tactical techniques of fourth generation warfare will require major changes in the way we educate, employ, structure, and train forces. Professional education, from initial-entry training to war-college level, will have to be broadened to deal with the wide spectrum of issues commanders will confront in a fourth generation conflict. As Arquilla and Ponfeldt stated, leaders must be prepared to "group together from a new perspective a number of measures that have been used before but were viewed separately." Training (as distinct from education) must expand to deal with tactical situations unique to fourth generation warfare, such as staged confrontations between security forces and unarmed women and children. Further, this broadened education must not be limited to military officers but must include decision makers from all agencies of the government involved with international security issues.

We must go beyond joint operations to interagency operations. If the enemy is going to strike across the spectrum of human activity, our national response must be coordinated across the multiple national agencies that deal with international issues. Just as joint undertaking had to evolve gradually into full-fledged joint operations, so will interagency operations have to mature from simple meetings to discuss cooperation into fully integrated national operations. Force structure must be reconsidered in light of fourth generation issues.

Fourth generation war will require much more intelligence gathering and analytical and dissemination capability to serve a highly flexible, interagency command system. At the same time, the fact that fourth generation war will include elements of earlier generations of war means our forces must be prepared to deal with these aspects too.

Finally, just as many current conflicts do not employ third generation tactics, not all future conflicts will be fought primarily using fourth generation tactics. Therefore, it will be essential for national leaders to make an accurate analysis of the war they are about to enter. The complex mix of generations of war with their overlapping political, economic, social, military, and mass media arenas makes determining the type of war we are entering more critical than ever. While much of Clausewitz' On War has been rendered obsolete by the enormous changes in the world, his admonition to national leaders remains more important than ever. Clausewitz wrote:

The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.​

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