I am not fighting with anyone, I'm debating. I don't get heated or upset at my screen at all. I don't consider anyone an enemy on this forum. In fact if TF was in my area, I'd take him to go have a beer...or coffee...or whatever he would like to drink if he was willing. Though I am only good for one or two rounds.
If anything these types of things help me read more about my history on both sides so I can figure out what is right or wrong. So again, I don't feel like I am fighting and I hope the feeling is mutual with others. If not...well...seriously...not my problem.
I agree, there shouldn't be any personal animus or demonizing of our conversation partners on this forum. I'm assuming goodwill, intellectual curiosity, open-mindedness and technical knowledge on all sides here. The history of TKD is murky and complex, and there's plenty that reasonable people can disagree about. As long as we can each provide factual evidence and rational argument to support our positions, I see nothing wrong with even intense disagreement.
Right now, what I want to do is question two things that miguksaram brought up:
(1) the degree to which the Kwan unification that gave rise to a number of organizational and curriculum changes in Korea ultimately culminating in the KKW was 'voluntary', in a sense that we would find normal, and
(2) the suitabilty of the typewriter vs. computer analogy that m. raised earlier, bearing in mind that an illustration or comparison can be vivid and effective, but that it may well be based on assuming a certain position as correct which is, in fact, under serious debate. More on this later...
So far as the voluntary nature of the Kwan 'synthesis' that miguksaram alludes to, I believe that there are plenty of grounds for reasonable skepticism. Post-war Korea was run by a series of extremely brutal, heavy-handed military dictators with definite ideas about how the MAs in the ROK should be organized. Surely we haven't forgotten how in 1947 Yun Cae, the director of the dreaded State Police, pressured Lee Won-kuk to 'deliver' the 5,000 or so members of the Chung Do Kwan to the Korean Liberal Party that Rhee had founded. After Lee, in his own words, 'politely declined' the office, guess what happened? If you answered, 'was accused of being a pro-Japanese terrorist', go to the head of the class—it happened, and the followup was that Lee and his wife and a number of CDK senior black belts were arrested and held in detention for
three years. No one, I imagine, will be surprised to learn that shortly after his release in 1950, Lee left Korea for Japan. No one following this fairly dramatic exercise in high-profile bullying could mistake the interest Rhee had in 'recruiting' highly trained hand-to-hand combat experts into his own faction—certainly not Lee himself, who is on record as voicing his suspicions about the political use that Rhee hoped to make of such a formidable 'palace guard'.
And this was this same Rhee who in 1954, after watching Gen. Choi's right-hand man Nam Tae-hi break several deep stacks of roofing tiles and give other evidence of his considerable technical expertise, decided that the ROK military as a whole would be trained in the arts he had witnessed and demanded a unified curriculum planned jointly by the Kwan leaders to serve as the basis for mass troop instruction.
That was the occasion for the 1955 committee meeting called by (the militarily high ranked and politically favored) Choi to devise both a name and a standardized program of instruction for a unitary Korean MA which both Choi and Song Duk-son claimed to have named 'Takewondo'.
Given the fairly savage methods of ensuring compliance that Rhee's secret police had already brought to bear on the MA community, targetting one of its most highly regarded senior leaders and forcing him in effect to emigrate, I have to say I'm
extremely skeptical that anything that happened under the Rhee and Park regimes, with General Choi himself given a largely free hand for much of that period to centralize power and control over the Korean MA world, could be fairly labelled 'voluntary'. With the example of Lee Won-kuk in front of you, would
you have insisted on remaining outside of the unification that the ROK's military bosses were so obviously insisting on? We know of one who did—Hwang Kee—and we also know that he was threatened and harassed at every turn, that his home was mysteriously burned down during a period when he was fighting Choi, the ROK's chosen 'unifier', to maintain the independence of the Moo Duk Kwan. As Eric Madis in his terrific state-of-the-art article on the modern history of TKD, 'The evolution of Taekwondo from Japanese Karate' (in
Martial Arts in the Modern World, T. Green and J. Svinth, eds., 2003, Praeger Books) notes of an only slightly later period than the famous 'unity' meeting,
In February 1971, the Korean Ministry of Education issued a requirement that all taekwondo schools have private school permits, thereby subjecting them to government regulation... With this, recalcitrant kwan leaders could be punished for retaining Japanese karate-based art names, and for refusing to comply with government standards and policies. Standard punishments included media blacklists, suppression of kwan publications, the inability to renew teaching contracts at educational institutions (particularly military and police academies), problems obtaining passports, threats of imprisonment, and assassination attempts.
(p. 204). And it was this same year, 1971, that the ROK military dictatorship established the Kukkiwon.
In view of this relentlessly oppressive intervention by a ruthless military state playing hardball as dirty as any of the Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe during the Iron Curtain era, I think there's a
hell of a burden of proof on the claim that
anything the kwan leaders did, particular when it involved giving up their own autonomy, was voluntary. Again, this is a historical argument, not a mathematical proof. But I think the description 'voluntary' is going to be pretty hard to defend, against that historical background.
And so far as the typewriter/computer comparison... it really does beg the question, I think, because it's only valid on the assumption that the KKW's TKD had the same objectives as the kwan era's TKD, but used a vastly better conceptual/technical/technological basis—that it was a much better machine for doing the same thing. But that's precisely what's in dispute. Those of us whose allegiance is to an earlier avatar of TKD would say that that version of TKD was primarily oriented toward structured, effective street defense in a dangerous, largely lawless era, while the KKW's objectives are the promotion of a highly specialized athletic application of martial movements based on the earlier TKD, for purposes of point scoring. Put this way, it's clear that the purposes of the two are radically different—and if that's true, then the typewriter/computer analogy really doesn't hold.