What I do not know about is the various threads and schisms of Islam and when the revisionist messages of 'death to the infidel' began to flame. That latter is, as I thought, very recent.
Well, kind of. But since the beginning Islam has viewed the world as divided into the dar-al Harb and the dar-al Islam, the House of War and the House of Submission. Interestingly, the dar-al Harb is also referred to as the dar-al Garb, that is, the House of the West. Probably not exactly a coincidence.
The dar-al Harb are those lands that are not under Shari'ah, have not had some kind of non aggression treaty with Islam and/or are not part of the dar-al Islam. In the dar-al Islam non Muslims are considered dhimmis and are second class citizens who are forced to abide by several rules which are often designed to humiliate them. Wearing distinctive clothing that identifies one as a non-Muslim, not being able to wear other clothing that is usually associated with the Muslim inhabitants of a certain country, not being able to build a house taller than those of Muslims in the same community, not being able to build a church taller than a local mosque, not being able to do even normal upkeep on churches or other houses of worship, having to hang identifying pictures or signs on their house so others knew non-Muslims lived there, and, of course, being forced to pay the jizya (the special tax that was levied for the privilege of not abandoning one's own faith).
Not being able to carry weapons for one's own self-protection is a very common prohibition that dhimmis must face, as well. That means relying totally on the local Muslim authorities for their personal safety. This protection was known to fail at times and there have been several slaughters of dhimmis throughout history. Likewise, the murder of a dhimmis by a non-Muslim carries no death penalty according to many (though not all; I can think of one off hand) Muslim schools of jurisprudence.
Bernard Lewis points out that the development of what we face now with regards to Islam began after the defeat of the Muslims at the battle of Lepanto in 1571. It was at this turning point that Muslim culture and learning began a steady decline and the Western way of warfare, learning, and culture came to ascendency even over traditional Muslim methods. The culmination came when Turkey was founded as a secular state by Ataturk with its laws based not on Shari'ah but the Swiss Constitution (and its laws governing religion having more in common with those in post-Revolutionary France than any Muslim country). Ataturk himself was the one who abolished the Caliphate in 1922. This was to have unforeseen consequences which we are dealing with now.
The Caliphate was an icon of the glory of Islam and reached back to the earliest days of the religion being founded in the days after Muhammad's death. Its abolishment ended the Muslim ideal of a single leader who wielded both political and religious authority at the head of a single Muslim community. Indeed, any attemtp to view Islam solely as a religious institution ignores not only its own teachings but its history, as well. Islam has always seen itself as a political community as well as a religious one. There is no separation of Church and State in Islam because there is no Church in Islam.
With the abolishment of the Caliphate the normal means of waging jihad changed. The normal means of doing so was under the authority of the legitimate ruler, in the case of Sunni Islam that is the Caliph (for the Shi'as it's the Imam, but that's a whole different matter). In the normal order of things, Jihad was a collective responsibility. Some Muslims would directly take part in combat, others would engage in support roles, still others would engage in jihad by somply going about their lives and being the best Muslims they could be.
With no Caliph jihad must take place under the emergency conditions that Islamic Jurispridence schools have developed over the centuries. Under these conditions jihad is an
individual responsibility with each Muslim in the immediate area of conflict being required to fight. This emergency jihad also does away with the required rules and regulations that govern combat including how combat was carried out, by whom, who was considered a non-combatant, etc. and most importantly for this conversation
who had the authority to call for jihad in the first place. The emergency form of jihad does away with all of the traditional distinctions the jurists made. Not just able bodied men but the sick, women and even children are responsible for jihad. Not just the members of the invading army were to be attacked but every non-Muslim was a potential target. What is more, it is no impossible for the normal method of jihad to be called since there no longer is a central authority figure in Islam since the Caliphate has been abolished.
What we are dealing with with much of the Muslim
terrorists is a conception of jihad that has developed in the last 100-125 years or so. It views the dar-al Islam as any area where there is a majority of Muslims and/or which was once a part of the historic dar al-Islam. Any non Muslim countries within these historic confines, as well as any other states that support them, are seen as aggressors. With the erasing of the usual lines of distinction because of the "emergency state" of jihad (which has existed much longer) is that any and all non-Muslims from a country that supports or is an allay with a country in a "traditionally Muslim" area are now legitimate targets and may be attacked in any way possible. Which should shed some light on why the U.S. and Israel aren't exactly popular in the Mid-East. (The whole oil thing is really secondary, IMNSHO.)
This view of jihad and the dar al-Islam leaves little room for a more historical view of how jihad was carried out or of tolerance for "people of the book," that is Christians and Jews (although, truth be told, some of the praising for Islamic tolerance of non-Muslims is a bit on the exaggerated side). Additionally, with no Caliph anyone in a position of authority in Islam can issue a fatwah calling for jihad, as long as such a war can be described in defensive terms (which is why Bin Laden
always paints the U.S. as the aggressor). Fortunately, since there is no Caliph, anyone is also free to ignore such a fatwah. But that situation is definitely a two-edged sword.
Pax,
Chris
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