I read the article somewhat differently. Although I do not believe it is intended to be taken as a pro-life argument, it could be.
The article points out that being a 'human being' is not enough to stop the legal abortion of a fetus. This is a basic argument that rages back and forth over abortion; no matter what else a fetus is it is most definitely a 'human being'. A human fetus has all of the attributes of a human being, down to the DNA. It will not become a puppy or a cat or a horse. It may live or die, naturally or assisted, but it is and will remain human tissue, all other arguments aside. Therefore, the argument goes, abortion is not about killing a human being, but about aborting a creature which is not (yet) a 'person' in the eyes of the law.
And what is a person? When is a person a person, and therefore entitled to the rights we accord persons (such as not being put to death on a whim legally)?
Some would argue that personhood attaches when a baby is delivered from its mother and first draws breath. Others would argue that personhood attaches when the baby becomes 'viable', meaning that it *could* draw breath if given the opportunity by being delivered outside the mother's body. Still others believe that personhood attaches when pain or other emotions can be felt. Or when a certain date in the pregnancy is passed, a certain age attained. And although indiscriminate killing of infants is a general taboo through the world, in ancient times and modern, there are cultures which place less emphasis on an infant's life if it is unwanted, or the product of rape, or born out of wedlock, or whatever reason; even if it is the wrong sex, has not attained a particular age (such as a year old) or been given a name. Our current Western standards are not universal.
The article basically looks at what 'personhood' is, and says:
Both a fetus and a newborn certainly are human beings and
potential persons, but neither is a ‘person’ in the sense of
‘subject of a moral right to life’. We take ‘person’ to mean an
individual who is capable of attributing to her own existence
some (at least) basic value such that being deprived of this
existence represents a loss to her. This means that many non-
human animals and mentally retarded human individuals are
persons, but that all the individuals who are not in the condition
of attributing any value to their own existence are not persons.
Merely being human is not in itself a reason for ascribing
someone a right to life. Indeed, many humans are not considered
subjects of a right to life: spare embryos where research on
embryo stem cells is permitted, fetuses where abortion is
permitted, criminals where capital punishment is legal.
Our point here is that, although it is hard to exactly determine
when a subject starts or ceases to be a ‘person’, a necessary
condition for a subject to have a right to X is that she is harmed
by a decision to deprive her of X. There are many ways in which
an individual can be harmed, and not all of them require that she
values or is even aware of what she is deprived of. A person
might be ‘harmed’ when someone steals from her the winning
lottery ticket even if she will never find out that her ticket was
the winning one. Or a person might be ‘harmed’ if something
were done to her at the stage of fetus which affects for the worse
her quality of life as a person (eg, her mother took drugs during
pregnancy), even if she is not aware of it. However, in such cases
we are talking about a person who is at least in the condition to
value the different situation she would have found herself in if
she had not been harmed. And such a condition depends on the
level of her mental development,6 which in turn determines
whether or not she is a ‘person’.
Those who are only capable of experiencing pain and pleasure
(like perhaps fetuses and certainly newborns) have a right not to
be inflicted pain. If, in addition to experiencing pain and plea-
sure, an individual is capable of making any aims (like actual
human and non-human persons), she is harmed if she is
prevented from accomplishing her aims by being killed. Now,
hardly can a newborn be said to have aims, as the future we
imagine for it is merely a projection of our minds on its potential
lives. It might start having expectations and develop a minimum
level of self-awareness at a very early stage, but not in the first
days or few weeks after birth. On the other hand, not only aims
but also well-developed plans are concepts that certainly apply
to those people (parents, siblings, society) who could be nega-
tively or positively affected by the birth of that child. Therefore,
the rights and interests of the actual people involved should
represent the prevailing consideration in a decision about
abortion and after-birth abortion.
Boiled down, the argument basically states that an infant is not a person because it does not have aims and goals. Depriving it of life deprives it of nothing, as it knows nothing; it certainly does not know it wishes to keep living. In the same paragraph, the article also argues that since both a fetus and a newborn can experience certain emotions such as pain, they must be protected from having to experience that. However, both fetus and infant can be killed without inflicting pain.
All the authors appear to be doing is pointing out that if 'personhood' is the basis on which we decide when a fetus (or an infant) can be aborted, then a different understanding of what personhood is leads to a different conclusion about when 'abortion' can or should be legally permitted. It moves the goalposts.
And in my mind, it makes a hash of the pro-choice arguments regarding when a pregnancy may be terminated. If personhood is the bar, then the bar may not be where you think it is. If personhood is not the bar, then what is the bar? It cannot be status as a human being, because every fertilized cell is a human cell and nothing else.
What is in-between human and person?
New frontiers.
Fascinating. Thanks for posting!