US Involvement in WWII

[grydth]

The German defeat was also sped along both before and after US involvement by the diversion of resources to militarily unimportant goals such as manning the death camps.

A grotesque oversimplification..... the monstrous Holocaust damaged the German War effort in far more egregious ways than diverting the mostly second line troops who formed the Death Camp guards.

Despite Nazi lies to the contrary, large numbers of Jews had valiantly served in both Austrian and German Armies for centuries... these men were instead murdered.

War work was disrupted when skilled Jewish workers making everything from gun sights to uniforms were taken off the job and murdered. (This omits those who fled Germany ahead of the SS.)

The same thing happened over and over again in conquered areas in the East - Nazi overseers trying to get local production restarted found experts and workers had already been killed by the Einsatzgruppen...... yes, large parts of the Holocaust did not occur in "the death camps", but on the spot or in ghettoes all across the East. This slaughter, along with the partisan movement which arose in large part from Nazi genocidal practices, is what occupied,delayed and killed those first line German troops.

 

[Empty Hands]

ONE German advance had been halted by early December 1941. There followed a Russian Winter Offensive, which, in turn was later savagely mauled by German counter attacks. There followed the major German Summer Offensive.....

After the end of the first offensive, Hitler realized he couldn't prosecute the war along the entire front, and made a grab for the south, including the Caucuses. The only reason that offensive did as well as it did was because the Soviet forces were concentrated around Moscow, and only 10% were available on the Southern front. The offensive was ended once the Soviets realized their mistake. The picture seems pretty clear that at least with the pressure on Germany along other fronts, the possibility of defeating Russia ended with the failure of the '41 offensive. Otherwise, why attempt to prosecute such limited objectives?

How about the Battle of the Atlantic against the U-Boats - was that halted by 1941, too?

The Battle of the Atlantic was to decide the delivery of supplies. U-boats are effective against shipping convoys, not tank or infantry battalions. Since I consider lend-lease not essential for the final outcome of the war, why would I consider the Battle of the Atlantic essential?

Were there no more Axis advances in North Africa after 1941?

There were no American troops in the Battle of El Alamein as far as I can determine. There were 300 Sherman tanks, but even without them, Monty still had the Germans outnumbered by 90,000 men, and the German supplies were nearly exhausted. I can't see that the US involvement here was essential.

 

[grydth]

The failure of the eastern offensive also helped stall the western offensive, and the Russians began rolling back the German military with little direct help. Direct US pressure only accelerated this process as resources were directed to the western front to match the US presence.

What of the significant German resources devoted to having to combat the US Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic?

What of the German men and material required in the North African and Italian areas? To garrison France and the Atlantic coast?

What of the German fighter forces and flak gunners required across Europe to combat US Air attacks - and the enormous damage to production and transportation capacity?

Think any of these affected Germany's overall defeat? Think any of these would have made a critical difference on the Eastern Front?

As far as the "little direct" help.... have you ever reviewed what was delivered via the convoys? You want to tell me where the Russians would have gotten this without us? You want to enlighten us on just how the Russians would - or could have successfully maintained their offensives without American trucks and jeeps?

 

[grydth]

The Battle of the Atlantic was to decide the delivery of supplies. U-boats are effective against shipping convoys, not tank or infantry battalions. Since I consider lend-lease not essential for the final outcome of the war, why would I consider the Battle of the Atlantic essential?

.

No, that is yet another oversimplification. Far more than Lend-Lease to Russia was at stake. There was genuine concern in Britain that the country itself could literally be starved out and its economy strangled.

U-boats are indeed one of the most effective ways to counter tank and infantry battalions! Which do you think is cheaper and easier - fighting an armored unit on the battlefield or drowning them at sea and sending the tanks to the ocean bottom? Take a look at a good history of the effects of US submarines and maritime strike aircraft on the Japanese from 1943 to 1945 and you will - perhaps - see what Britain was faced with.

 

[grydth]

There were no American troops in the Battle of El Alamein as far as I can determine. There were 300 Sherman tanks, but even without them, Monty still had the Germans outnumbered by 90,000 men, and the German supplies were nearly exhausted. I can't see that the US involvement here was essential.

Let's look at those "300 Sherman tanks"......any idea what the most powerful German panzers in Africa at that time were? Any idea about how well the British tanks of the era matched up against them?

Can you cite any authority that American arms, armor and assistance were an immaterial factor in finally declining the North African campaign?

Was El Alamein the only conflict of any significance in the North African campaign? Whose forces were those which, after Operation Torch, were squeezing the Axis from the West? Think those quarter million Axis prisoners taken at the end might have made any difference on the Eastern Front.

 

[grydth]

After the end of the first offensive, Hitler realized he couldn't prosecute the war along the entire front, and made a grab for the south, including the Caucuses. The only reason that offensive did as well as it did was because the Soviet forces were concentrated around Moscow, and only 10% were available on the Southern front. The offensive was ended once the Soviets realized their mistake. The picture seems pretty clear that at least with the pressure on Germany along other fronts, the possibility of defeating Russia ended with the failure of the '41 offensive. Otherwise, why attempt to prosecute such limited objectives?

No, no, no!

The war wasn't "prosecuted" by the Germans along the entire front in 1942?

That'd be news to Leningrad in the North, caught in a savage siege. That'd be news to the great naval fortress Sevastopol in the Crimea, stormed after a siege. How about Kharkov? I could cite any other number of battles, but would it make any difference?

"A grab for the south"? Good heavens, look at the map of the offensives!

The Germans did not succeed solely for the reasons you cite. One unstated reason was that they still possessed outstanding panzer forces and at this stage were more than capable of beating the Russians on terrain such as this. A second unmentioned reason was the terrible mauling the Germans had inflicted on the Russians in men and material. A third reason not noted was the skillful withdrawals carried out by some Soviet commanders. A fourth reason was that the Soviets - intelligently - were not feeding all of their forces into the front line.

Once again.... please cite me any authority who supports your conclusions about 1941.

 

[Empty Hands]

The Germans did NOT abandon the drive on Moscow in 1941 for a drive to the oil fields. The Panzer Corps were turned south, away from Moscow, in Fall of 1941 for the purpose of fighting major battles of encirclement and obtaining the resources of Ukraine.

Army Group Centre was only 200 miles away from Moscow when they were diverted to the North to assist in the taking of Leningrad and the South to assist in taking the oil fields. This was accomplished at Hitler's insistence and over the objections of his generals. Also, from the beginning, Army Group South was tasked with seizing the Caucuses.

 

[Empty Hands]

What of the significant German resources devoted to having to combat the US Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic?

A u-boat or destroyer won't do much good on the plains west of Moscow.

What of the German men and material required in the North African and Italian areas? To garrison France and the Atlantic coast?

They were already there in an attempt to cut off English supply through the Suez canal.

What of the German fighter forces and flak gunners required across Europe to combat US Air attacks - and the enormous damage to production and transportation capacity?

Think any of these affected Germany's overall defeat? Think any of these would have made a critical difference on the Eastern Front?

All of this was a concern after Germany had already had their advances halted. They were in retreat in N. Africa, for instance. The US eighth air force did not begin operations until August of 1942, and US raids had little practical effect until the second half of 1943.

As far as the "little direct" help.... have you ever reviewed what was delivered via the convoys? You want to tell me where the Russians would have gotten this without us? You want to enlighten us on just how the Russians would - or could have successfully maintained their offensives without American trucks and jeeps?

Yes actually, I have already noted earlier in this thread, had you read it carefully, that the US provided significant infrastructure to the Russians, such as 2/3rds of their trucks. This occurred however long after the Germans had suffered the major defeats that stalled their advance, mainly the disaster in '41.

 

[grydth]

Army Group Centre was only 200 miles away from Moscow when they were diverted to the North to assist in the taking of Leningrad and the South to assist in taking the oil fields. This was accomplished at Hitler's insistence and over the objections of his generals. Also, from the beginning, Army Group South was tasked with seizing the Caucuses.

Would you possibly consider reviewing either Hitler Moves East by Paul Carell or the Operation Barbarossa series by Robert Kirchubel before posting any more of this.... stuff...?

 

[Empty Hands]

Let's look at those "300 Sherman tanks"......any idea what the most powerful German panzers in Africa at that time were? Any idea about how well the British tanks of the era matched up against them?

By the time El Alamein rolled around, a number of Rommel's 500 tanks were poorer Italian models. They were also short of fuel. Even without the Shermans, Monty still had 200 tanks over Rommel along with adequate supply, and 90,000 more men.

Can you cite any authority that American arms, armor and assistance were an immaterial factor in finally declining the North African campaign?

I don't argue by authority, it is a logical fallacy.

Was El Alamein the only conflict of any significance in the North African campaign? Whose forces were those which, after Operation Torch, were squeezing the Axis from the West? Think those quarter million Axis prisoners taken at the end might have made any difference on the Eastern Front.

El Alamein was the point where the Germans were fully halted, the indisputable turning point of the campaign. They were in full retreat before the US landed and engaged in North Africa. I rather doubt the prisoners would have made a huge difference, considering the tactical and strategic situation on the Eastern front.

 

[Empty Hands]

Would you possibly consider reviewing either Hitler Moves East by Paul Carell or the Operation Barbarossa series by Robert Kirchubel before posting any more of this.... stuff...?

What in my quote was wrong? You know damn well it is accurate, you are trying to fob me off on other historical works so you don't have to rebut it.

ETA: Here are some links to back up this rather indisputable point. I don't know what about this conversation has got you so emotional, but you've become a real jerk - and sloppy too.
"On 23 August, Hitler had decided that the main effort of the German Army was not to be Moscow - which was barely 320km (200 miles) from the lead elements of Army Group Centre's panzers - but rather Leningrad and the Ukraine."
http://www.germanwarmachine.com/operationbarbarossa/armygroupcentre2.htm

"Hitler, however, was not satisfied, and over the generals' protests, he ordered Army Group Center to divert the bulk of its armor to the north and south to help the other two army groups, thereby stopping the advance toward Moscow."
http://www.history.com/minisite.do?...play_order=2&sub_display_order=3&mini_id=1090

"What went wrong? Stolfi points to Hitler's momentous decision in mid-August to divert German forces southward. Overruling objections from several of his generals, Hitler ordered Army Group Center to veer south to first strike into Ukraine and Crimea, smashing the remaining Soviet forces there and capturing major economic and strategic objectives, before resuming the drive on Moscow....Hitler's decision in August 1941 to strike south before continuing the drive east, Stolfi believes, was the critically fatal decision of the war. This, and not the later, "anti-climactic" battles of Stalingrad, Alamein, or Kursk, was the war's real turning point. "...The German failure to seize Moscow in August 1941," he writes (p. 202), "was the turning point in the Russian campaign. After that, the Germans faced certain defeat in the Second World War, an outcome that altered fundamentally the course of events in this century."
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v15/v15n6p38_Bishop.html

There's your big authority arguing my point BTW, as much as it pains me to post it. "Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted", by Russell H.S. Stolfi. University of Oklahoma.

 

[Empty Hands]

"A grab for the south"? Good heavens, look at the map of the offensives!

A concentration on a southern offensive does not mean that all soldiers everywhere immediately headed in that direction. Other forces were still in action elsewhere. However, Army Group South was reinforced by divisions from other sectors as well as other Axis divisions. It was the focus.

 

[grydth]

A u-boat or destroyer won't do much good on the plains west of Moscow.

Such wit!

However, study of the submarine warfare as practiced in the Second World War would illustrate that eliminating a unit or its equipment (or both) while in transit at sea was immensely preferable to trying to destroy said unit in a land battle. Just two examples - the British intercepting the German replacement convoy bound for Crete and the American efforts interdicting the Tokyo Express. The same values and objectives hold true for strategic bombing via aircraft - destroying units and equipment in transport or at the production facility.

Numerous historical sources of maritime aircraft, destroyer and submarine warfare are available for review, assuming that is, that one wants to know.

 

[Empty Hands]

Such wit!

All right *******, I'm done with you. If anyone else wants to have a real, respectful conversation about this topic, let me know. I'm done with your abuse grydth.

 

[grydth]

Army Group Centre was only 200 miles away from Moscow when they were diverted to the North to assist in the taking of Leningrad and the South to assist in taking the oil fields. This was accomplished at Hitler's insistence and over the objections of his generals. Also, from the beginning, Army Group South was tasked with seizing the Caucuses.

Above one may find the final contested quote which led to my being labelled, among other things, a "real jerk" and " **** " .....

In any event, it is scarcely an original tactic for my adversay to declare victory while running away. One who knows so little should be engaged in learning, not making foolish sweeping assertions about the value of the enormous contributions of this nation in the Second World War.

The only matter, for personal honor sake, which I feel it necessary to address in detail is the assertion of intellectual dishonesty. Kirchhubel specifically states, " the Wehrmacht leadership could not present a united front to dissuade the Fuhrer from the southern option." (Volume 3, page 62). What's more, to ignore the primary and immediate objective of the move south, which resulted in the immense battle of annihialtion at Kiev (five Soviet Armies destroyed, 665,000 POWS - Carell, page 129), belies understanding.

In decades of discussing and debating the Second World War, I have never seen the citation of authority - and well respected historical authority - taken as some type of subterfuge, dishonesty or dodge.

When the citation of respected experts in a field becomes something sinister, it is high time that I leave this thread and employ the "Ignore" function so graciously provided by Admin.

 

[Empty Hands]

That is a breathtakingly dishonest reading of our exchange, as well as the point of my quote, and my comments about citing authorities. I know I said I was done with you, but it was so egregious I could not let it stand without comment. Enjoy your "victory".

 

[theletch1]

[playnice]Jeff Letchford[/playnice]

 

[Xue Sheng]

It was my Maginot Line comment wasn't it?

I'm sorry :uhyeah:

 

[Bigshadow]

A grotesque oversimplification..... the monstrous Holocaust damaged the German War effort in far more egregious ways than diverting the mostly second line troops who formed the Death Camp guards.

You mean it had nothing to do with the allied bombing missions where all the major roads, railways, and any other infrastructure that was used to move supplies and people from one side of Germany to another were destroyed?

 

[Empty Hands]

It was my Maginot Line comment wasn't it?

I'm sorry :uhyeah:

No, I think that was a comment we can all agree on.