The attack on the USS Liberty - Friendly Fire/Fog of War or Something Else?

[Ninjamom]

Please allow me to summarize the discussion thus far.

Overview.
These online sources provide a good overview of the facts and issues:

1. The Wikipedia article on the USS Liberty incident gives balanced insight into the facts and the debates.
2. The National Security Agency (NSA) has a dedicated website providing transcripts of declassified memos, electronic surveillance, and eye-witness testimony relevant to the Liberty incident, much of it declassified and released as late as June 8, 2007 (40th anniversary of the attack).
3. A BBC documentary is available on YouTube. While some have questioned its conclusions and/or political slant, it does provide interviews with a dozen military, intelligence, and political leaders from the era with first-hand knowledge of the events, as well as the testimony of a half dozen Liberty survivors who were eye-witnesses to the actual attack. (See also interview with LTCDR (ret) Ennes here.)
4. The USS Liberty survivor’s website provides additional information.
5. The Wikipedia article on Israel’s Six Days War will help place these events in their historical context.

Facts.

Important facts from review of these sources are:
1. The USS Liberty was patrolling in the Mediterranean Sea parallel to the shore of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip on the morning of June 8, 1967.
2. According to the declassified findings of the US Naval Court of Inquiry, at least 8 Israeli overflights of the Liberty occurred prior to that attack, including 5 overflights by slow-moving ‘flying boxcar’ type craft used specifically for observation and identification. These slower overflights occurred at 0515, 1056, 1145, 1220, and 1245 the day of the attack.
3. The Israeli court of inquiry acknowledged that the Liberty had been sighted by 0600, marked on the situation status board, identified as an American supply vessel at 0900, and re-identified as the USS Liberty at 10:55. Within 5 minutes of being identified as a US intelligence ship, it was removed from the situation board because the location data was considered outdated. Within one hour, three motorized torpedo boats (MTBs) were dispatched to the area to look for a ship possibly involved in bombardment of the coast near El Arish, with combat air support to follow. (All sides agree today that El Arish was not bombed from the sea.)
4. At approximately 1403, jets of the Israeli Air Force began aerial bombardment of the USS Liberty, including multiple bombing runs involving rockets, bombs, cannons, and napalm, and strafing runs from multiple aircraft flying a criss-cross pattern over the ship.
5. The three MTBs caught up to the Liberty and commenced firing torpedoes and guns. One torpedo struck the starboard side amidship, causing a ten degree list in the vehicle and rendering her near dead in the water. Strafing from the MTBs continued afterwards.
6. According to the Israeli findings, the MTBs miscalculated the speed of the Liberty when they picked it up on radar, and therefore identified it as a hostile target, even though it had not fired on them and they still did not have any visual contact. As the Israeli MTBs picked the Liberty up on radar, jets were dispatched to assist in the attack. Based on the Naval tentative ID (by speed and location alone), the aircraft were authorized to fire on the vessel without positive ID. (The head of the Naval department who authorized the attack was present and in command in the Situation room when the Liberty was identified, placed on the status board, and removed from the board 2 1/2 hours earlier.) Coming into visual range and seeing the Israeli aircraft had attacked, the MTBs assumed the vessel had been confirmed as a hostile, and so joined in the attack. MTB crews paused to confirm the identity of the target ship, misidentified it as the Egyptian El Quseir, then recommenced their attack. HQ passed a message to abort the attack for reconfirmation of the target ID. This message was confirmed received and relayed to the MTB commander; however, he did not order the cease fire as directed by Naval HQ. With these findings, the same Israeli court of inquiry found no negligence, no wrong-doing, and no grounds for criminal charges or military discipline.
7. USS Liberty radiomen reported a buzzing on their communications frequencies, jamming attempts to signal their distress throughout the attack. The frequencies jammed were unique to US Naval operations and emergency communications.
8. There are significant discrepancies of material fact between the US Naval Court of Inquiry and the Israeli inquiry, including the time and number of Israeli aircraft overpasses and the attempts (or lack thereof) at communication prior to the attack.
9. Multiple life rafts were damaged during the attacks; however, after the torpedo attack and after the command had been given to prepare to abandon ship, three serviceable life rafts were lowered into the water. Two were immediately strafed and sunk by the MTBs and the third was shot clear of the Liberty and picked up by the crew of one of the attacking MTBs as it floated near.



Debate.

The debate centers on one issue: Did Israel know that the USS Liberty was an American non-combatant vessel when it was attacked? There are only three options:
1. The ship was misidentified as an enemy combatant vessel and attacked as the result of gross negligence, reckless disregard for life, and/or complete incompetence.
2. The ship was identified as an American vessel, but attacked by overzealous individuals within Israel’s Air and Naval forces.
3. The ship was known to be a US non-combatant vessel, but the National Command Authority of the state of Israel ordered it attacked anyway.

Additional Notes of Interest.

1. The first option above is the official position of the State of Israel. ‘Friendly Fire’ incidents do occur, especially in the fog of war. American pilots have been involved in such incidents. In such cases, even if the pilot involved were cleared of all criminal charges, the incident would almost certainly mark the end of the officer’s career. However, the pilot that led the attack on the USS Liberty rose through the ranks to brigadier general, holding senior military positions, and until very recently, continuing after retirement as an instructor for new Israeli military pilots.
2. As noted in the quotes posted here, and many more available through the primary sources listed above, the leaders of the political, military, and intelligence communities of the United States at the time did not accept the official Israeli explanation or believe that the attack was a case of mistaken identity.
3. The Admiral in charge of the official US investigation of the incident estimated that a proper investigation would take at least 6 months. His investigation was completed after 6 days, included interviews of only 14 of the Liberty’s crew of more than 300, and excised pertinent information from the interviews that were taken. The presiding officer of the inquiry later admitted that he was ordered as to what the findings of his investigation would be.
4. According to the Wikipedia article on the Six Days War, there were no direct naval engagements between Israel and any of the Arab nations during the war. The only other naval incidents by Israel or any Arab nation were the capture of some Israeli frogmen near Cairo and the seizure of an abandoned Egyptian naval vessel off the Sinai point.
5. An intelligence communiqué not declassified until December 2006 reported Israeli air-to-ground communications on the morning of the incident in which the pilot positively identified an American vessel, with the American flag clearly visible, and reconfirmed the information with a second overhead pass. The pilot noted there were no personnel seen on the ship’s deck, suggesting the observation took place during a general quarters drill, documented to have occurred from 1310 to 1350, somewhere between 1 hour and fifteen minutes before the attack.
6. Israel has always maintained that its pilots and naval crews thought they were firing on the Egyptian horse carrier, El Quseir. Diplomats point out that the Liberty could not possibly travel as fast as the miscalculated speed given by the MTB crews; therefore, they had reason to exclude the Liberty as the possible target vessel. However, the El Quseir could not make that speed either.
7. Israel maintains that no pilot or MTB crewmembers saw any US flag displayed until after the attack ceased. However, all USS Liberty ‘top-side’ personnel reported seeing the US flag extended and clearly visible prior to the attack. Ships records indicate it was actively replaced with the larger ‘holiday colors’ between the air assault and the torpedo firing. Surviving crew members report they were able to spot and ID the much smaller Israeli flag and markings on the lead MTB through the smoke during the attack.
8. Specific intelligence goals, including what direction antennas were pointed, which frequencies were monitored, and what nations/languages were targeted, are still classified 40+ years later (see e.g., Liberty tasking message and Historical report chapter entitled “Considerations for the Ship’s Deployment”, pages 5 through 13)


Remaining Questions

The biggest remaining question is, “Why?” What possible motive could the Israeli government have for ordering the sinking of the USS Liberty, knowing it was a US vessel? What possible benefit could Israel hope to derive that would outweigh the risks and damages to its relationship to the United States? What could possibly be weighed in the balance and considered worth the lives of 300 US servicemen, and why would the US government be willing to settle for a ‘back-door’ investigation and close the issue quietly?

Possible Scenario

With this information and discussion as a background, I would like to propose a possible scenario that I think best fits with all the facts of this situation. Stay tuned….

 

[Ninjamom]

The USS Liberty Incident

Historical Backdrop

At the height of the Cold War, the USSR supported Egypt, Syria, and Iraq with military hardware, training, advisors, and intelligence as they prepared for a confrontation with Israel in late spring, 1967. At the time, the US was not as closely allied with Israel as it is today; in fact, Israel’s major supplier of military hardware was France, with Great Britain a distant second. Still, support for Israel in the impending conflict was seen as a counterbalance to the Soviet’s support of the Arab alliance in the global game of nuclear chess. In May of 1967, as Israel and her Arab neighbors moved steadily towards war, the US Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carriers USS Saratoga and USS America, was put on alert and repositioned towards the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet Union already had a sizable fleet amassed in the eastern Mediterranean, with backup close by from its Black Sea ports. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin threatened a strike against the US via the ‘hotline’, if the US moved its fleet any closer. Meanwhile, Russian warships and electronic surveillance trawlers began shadowing US naval maneuvers throughout the area. The Cold War game of chess rapidly turned into a nuclear stare-down to see who would blink over the Middle East first.

In 1967 the young nation of Israel was just 19 years from Independence, and 22 years from Auschwitz. The plans, goals, and attitudes throughout the military and political establishments were permeated with the undercurrent of the mantra, ‘Never Again’. Against this backdrop, Israeli scientists had been working on the nuclear option since 1958 as the ultimate assurance of a Holocaust happening ‘Never Again’. With the help of the French, the Negev Nuclear Research Center was built in Israel’s southern desert, about 8 miles (13 km) from Dimona, and a clandestine program was begun to develop a military nuclear capability.

According to Avner Cohen, (author of the book, “Israel and the Bomb”, and a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland), the nuclear option was seen as crucial to Israel’s long-term survival, but admission to the existence of any developmental program carried severe military and political risks. The early years of the program were marked by great ambivalence, as the political leaders demonstrated a desire to develop the technology, but a reluctance to announce its presence or move towards deployment. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had hoped that the technology could possibly be used as a bargaining chip to be given up in exchang for peace. (See Cohen’s website, editorial article, and interview).


The political climate made it critical for Israel to develop a credible nuclear capability as a safeguard against the surrounding hostility. At the same time, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the US had been moving towards international agreements and sanctions for nuclear non-proliferation and were putting intense political pressure on Israel to join a non-proliferation agreement. Israel had a brief window in which to develop her nuclear capability in secret before any such attempts would be severely hampered by international pressure, or completely stifled by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which opened for international signature just one year later.

Israel’s official policy of ‘deliberate opacity’ continued, as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser had already flatly announced that his country would embark on its own quest to develop a nuclear capability the moment Israel announced it was pursuing one (and at the time, Egypt had the full financial and technical backing of the USSR to do it). Any mention even of a desire for nuclear weapons would further isolate Israel, provoke intense political consequences from the US, and spark a Mideast nuclear arms race. Thus, the existence of any Israeli nuclear weapons program, let alone its status, became Israel’s most closely guarded national military and political secret, kept from both enemies and allies alike.

While political will to weaponize and deploy nuclear technology was equivocal, the scientific development was not. Israel’s nuclear program was on the verge of a breakthrough at a time when the scientists involved saw it as a moral imperative to complete their work. The Federation of American Scientists believes that Israel had a working nuclear device by 1966; however, more reasonable estimates, including a 1967 CIA report , placed Israel’s development of its first nuclear weapon to that year. Cohen believes a major breakthrough in Israeli nuclear developmental technology occurred at exactly this time. Regardless of the exact status and estimates, it is reasonable that, in the buildup to impending war, the Israeli scientists would have been able to put together at least one, and probably two, working prototypes by June of 1967. (See also NTI’s Israel Nuclear Chronology, entries for May and June 1967.)

The Israelis had observed high altitude aerial reconnaissance flights over the Negev Nuclear Test Center in the last two weeks of May, with one flight coordinated with Russian MiG fighters. Cohen suggests this caused a near-panic at Israel’s highest political level, and was viewed as a prelude to attack. Complicating the crisis, evidence indicated the fighters were not Egyptian-flown MiG-21s, but Soviet pilots flying new MiG-25s. The Israeli command was concerned that the outbreak of war with Egypt would be used as a cover for Soviet pilots to fly and ensure destruction of the nuclear research center and Israel’s nascent nuclear capability. (See Soviet 2007 admissions regarding the MiG overflights, as well as Ginor and Remez, “Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six Days’ War”, Yale University Press, 2007.)

The NNTC was seen as the highest value military target in Israel, and the most inevitable target in the impending conflict. Regardless of the exact state of development, any nuclear device, any prototype, and any enriched fuel already produced would be a guaranteed target to be destroyed in the first wave of the imminent air war. To provide an option for national survival in the current situation and to protect a nuclear capability for any future confrontations with the surrounding regional powers, all enriched fuel, components, prototypes, or devices would have to be moved without alerting the Soviets or the Americans to their new location, or even to their existence.

Throughout May of 1967 tension built as Israel and her Arab neighbors moved closer to what would come to be known as the Six Days War. Egyptian forces had amassed 7 divisions, including 100,000 troops and 950 tanks, at the Sinai border, forced the exodus of the UN’s Sinai peace-keeping forces, and closed the Straights of Tirana to Israeli shipping, sealing off Israel’s Indian Ocean access through the port of Eilat. The May 30th signing of a mutual defense treaty between Egypt and Jordan threatened to open a second front in the upcoming war, with Israel’s midsection perilously exposed. Continued activity along the Syrian border, including an aerial incursion and dogfight over the Golan Heights, fueled the belief that Syria would enter the upcoming war as well. Egypt’s Nasser continued his vocal proclamations that he intended the complete annihilation of the Jewish state. Surrounded by armies poised for attack and isolated from much of the world, Israel found itself in what it rightly believed to be a fight for national survival.


A possible scenario:

Against this backdrop, picture the following scenario. (Statements in italic font are conjectured. All other statements in the following paragraphs are verifiable through sources sited.)

A small nation whose collective memory is scarred by an attempt to wipe out its race only 22 years ago finds itself surrounded by enemies vowing its annihilation. By every intelligence estimate, the combined armies of three nations, already stationed at the borders, are poised for imminent attack. One of the world’s two nuclear superpowers, while funding and supplying the Arab armies, waits to use their attack as cover to eliminate Israel’s only definitive defense – a potential nuclear capability. The other nuclear superpower seems ambivalent towards Israel’s situation. A major breakthrough in the nuclear weapons program gives one option of last resort, in what looks to be a fight for national survival. In order to safeguard its existence, prepare for its possible use, and protect it from an Egyptian or Soviet conventional missile strike, Israel is forced to move its nuclear research capabilities in the open.

In order to avert either a nuclear confrontation or total national disintegration, four vital military secrets must be kept. These secrets aren’t to avoid political embarrassment, gain a battlefield advantage, or even protect the lives of some of the citizens and soldiers. These military secrets are viewed to be of such a nature that the survival of the entire nation depends upon protecting them. No one can know of the existence of Israel’s nuclear program. No one can know its status (number and size of weapons or prototypes). No one can know where the research infrastructure has been moved. And no one can know if, when, and where Israel has managed to deploy one of its devices.

On the morning of June 8, 1967, during active hostilities with the Soviet proxies of Egypt, Syria, and others, The Israeli Air Force verifies the location and identity of the USS Liberty, a ‘technical research ship’ staffed with trained linguists and signals intercepts specialists from the US Navy and the National Security Agency. Patrolling 12.5 nautical miles (23 km) off the coast of the Sinai peninsula and Gaza strip, the Liberty holds the entire Sinai battlefield and most of Israel within range of its electronic ‘ears’. By 11 a.m., its patrol pattern takes it within 60 miles (95 km) of the Negev Nuclear Research Center. In the middle of a war for Israel’s national survival, the secrets upon which that survival depend are about to come into jeopardy.

The Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces is alerted to the presence of the US surveillance vessel. The vessel had been known to be in the same patrol range since 6 am that morning, and possibly since it arrived off the Sinai Peninsula the night before. Any communications relative to the repositioning of the nuclear assets, from encrypted orders from Headquarters to careless radio communications between truck drivers, could be assumed recorded. Hebrew language specialists would not be necessary on-board the Liberty, because all data not deciphered or translated immediately would be analyzed later in other NSA and military facilities. A decision was made that there was significant risk that some element of the plans to move the nuclear program had been compromised.

Although the US was considered an ally, it had a history of significant security lapses, with numerous high-level moles and spies from the USSR specifically targeting the Department of State and military technological developments. Israel considered the USSR to be a greater long-term threat to her survival than any of her maniacal Arab neighbors. In fact, it was believed at the time that the USSR intended to use the Arab war with Israel as a cover to attack the known positions of her suspected developmental nuclear program. The risk to Israel’s national survival was deemed great enough to warrant an emergency mission to guarantee the communications captured regarding her nuclear program never reached enemy hands. The decision was made to sink the Liberty and assure all recorded data was lost at sea.

Elements of the Israeli Air Force were in direct communication with the Israeli head of Naval Operations throughout this time. By 12:00 rumors had been circulated that Israeli positions near El Arish were under naval bombardment from the Mediterranean. This provided a justification for the head of Naval Operations to order three Motorized Torpedo Boats (MTBs) to identify and engage a hostile vessel in the area. Air support would be provided by the Israeli Air Force. At this time, there were no other neutral or hostile vessels identified on the situation board immediately off the Sinai’s northern coast.


Attack Timeline

Combining the findings of both the US and the Israeli courts of inquiry (1967) with the eye-witness testimony of surviving USS Liberty crew members, the following timeline can be reconstructed. At 10:55 the Israeli Air Force identified a vessel that had been tracked all morning off the Gaza coast as the USS Liberty, a US naval vessel known by them to be an electronics surveillance ship. At 12:05 orders were given by the head of the Israeli Naval Department for the 3 MTBs to intercept the vessel, with coordination from the Israeli Air Force to provide air support. By 2:04 the USS Liberty was engaged in a full aerial assault that included anti-personnel and territory denial weapons, leaving the Liberty with no eavesdropping capability and limited communications of any sort. Communications on US Navy operational and emergency frequencies were jammed. The ship was torpedoed, and reasonably expected to sink. Life rafts deployed into the water were strafed.

A review of this timeline strongly implies that the Israeli government knew they were targeting a US naval vessel and wanted it sunk with no survivors before any communications could be sent. If such an account is accurate, the state of Israel will never be able to admit it took place. Even forty years later, Israel has still never admitted it has a program for the development of nuclear weapons, let alone the status or size of such a program. (See also the case of Mordechai Vanunu.) For the United States government at the time to have accepted anything other than the official Israeli position that the Liberty was accidentally attacked through a case of mistaken identity would have invited inquiry into alternative Israeli motives, sparking a Mideast nuclear arms race and possibly drawing the US and the Soviet Union into a head-to-head Mideast confrontation.


Aftermath and Conclusion

Forty years after the incident, the survivors and family members of the USS Liberty crew deserve to know what happened. While an official admission might be out of the question, they should know that their sacrifices mattered. By not revealing the true motives for the attack, those men purchased a 30 year ‘hold’ on the Middle East arms race, and probably prevented the Soviet Union from funding the development of a nuclear Egypt, Syria, and/or Iraq. Their sacrifice slowed Mideast nuclear development so that no credible regional nuclear threat could develop until 1981 (Iraq) or the current decade (Iran). They paid so that a later generation of American servicemen could liberate Kuwait (Desert Storm) and Iraq (Gulf II) without having to face a nuclear threat.

One can only hope that higher-echelon US government officials were able to capitalize on their knowledge of what actually transpired to assure limits on the spread of nuclear technology or any future regional hostilities. Perhaps one day such facts will be revealed, and the contribution of the USS Liberty and her crew openly acknowledged.

 

[elder999]

. Thus, the existence of any Israeli nuclear weapons program, let alone its status, became Israel’s most closely guarded national military and political secret, kept from both enemies and allies alike.

The Federation of American Scientists believes that Israel had a working nuclear device by 1966; however, more reasonable estimates, including a 1967 CIA report , placed Israel’s development of its first nuclear weapon to that year. Cohen believes a major breakthrough in Israeli nuclear developmental technology occurred at exactly this time. Regardless of the exact status and estimates, it is reasonable that, in the buildup to impending war, the Israeli scientists would have been able to put together at least one, and probably two, working prototypes by June of Israel is forced to move its nuclear research capabilities in the open.. A decision was made that there was significant risk that some element of the plans to move the nuclear program had been compromised.
.

I won't comment on any of this. I have nothing more to add.

 

[Ninjamom]

For those still interested in this topic, I found more circumstantial evidence that supports the contention that Israel's nuclear research capability was moved to a new location around this time.

Here is a link to a recently declassified aerial photograph of the Negev Nuclear Test Center, taken November 1968 (a little more than a year after the events under discussion). Here is a link to an aerial photograph taken from about the same era, to approximately the same scale, of the Pentagon, Washington DC. Both photographs were taken with the US's CORONA satellite surveillance system. (Pictures courtesy of Wikipedia.)

Comparing the two photographs, does anyone notice anything missing from the 1968 photograph of the NNTC?

(Note: those 'missing items' can be found on current pictures of the NNTC, as viewed through Google Earth.)