Marine Lieut. charged with murder for killing Iraqi's

1. You were quoted accurately, and in context: you're arguing about interpretation.

2. Simple connection: excessive force, employed in ways that lead to a death.

3. Listen up: please show me where I said anything, "to try and make him and our military in general out to be the bad guys." That's your fantasy, not mine.

The absurd notion that soldiers cannot be guilty of such murder, given their situation, is directly contradicted by the Geneva Accords, the Nuremberg Trials, and the present UCMJ.
 
rmcrobertson said:
2. Simple connection: excessive force, employed in ways that lead to a death.

3. Listen up: please show me where I said anything, "to try and make him and our military in general out to be the bad guys." That's your fantasy, not mine.

The absurd notion that soldiers cannot be guilty of such murder, given their situation, is directly contradicted by the Geneva Accords, the Nuremberg Trials, and the present UCMJ.

2. I think that the whole point of Lt. Pantano's case in that in his opinion, and also in the opinion of his supporters (myself included) what he did wasn't excessive force. It was the force that was called for in his situation. I doubt that someone who beat to death a man in shackles could argue the same thing, but who knows.

3. This is just semantics, you bringing up a totally unrealated incident one in which you claim a member of the military beat a person to death for no reason, is where I got this idea from. To me it seemed like an attempt to vilify the military in general. Perhaps I misinterpreted your intentions, but I doubt it.

And once again, I will point out that I never meant to imply that soldiers could do no wrong, just that I don't think this particular one did anything that was not justified, given the situation he was in as I understand it.
 
RRouuselot said:
Thanks for misquoting me.
Actually, I quoted you exactly.

How else do you think your quote should have been interpreted? Do you think speeding tickets should be handed out at the Indy 500, and that some people in a war zone should, under some circumstances, be charged for murder?
 
Axly, "ginshun," I'm not claiming any such thing. The Navy brought the charges, as they did in the other case.

But I'd be curious to know what you'd call it when a group of SEALs grab somebody out of a house, throw a hood over his head and drag him to their base, beat the helpless prisoner for a while, then turn him over to the CIA at the local prison, and they chain him up so that he's hanging from a wall with both arms twisted up and back behind him--and in the morning, the guy's dead.

What would that be, exactly?

I get pretty sick and tired of these constant, "you must hate America," comments. I could pretty much assure you that I've been in this country a helluva lot longer than you, and I like to think that I've done as much for my country as you ever have, but don't let me stop the Mikey Savagism.

But you do have a point, since as a wacky radical I tend to be opposed to murder. Go figure.
 
PeachMonkey said:
Actually, I quoted you exactly.

How else do you think your quote should have been interpreted? Do you think speeding tickets should be handed out at the Indy 500, and that some people in a war zone should, under some circumstances, be charged for murder?
Maybe I should have said misunderstanding my comment and then quoting it out of context.
You obviously tried to take my sarcastic comment and use it for your own benefit.
Do I think nobody should never be charged with murder in a war zone? No, there are most definitely some cases where they should be.

Just out of curiosity do you think we should charge bomber pilots and their crews from WWII, Korean, and Vietnam wars with murder since they killed literally millions of innocent men, women and children?
 
Try as you might Robert, your point is being made in the wrong place. There is no connection, besides somebody being dead, between these cases. Its like comparing the recent school shootings in Mn. to a gas station robbery/killing in the same town because the subjucts were both Native Americans.

What is the similarity between these cases besides charges being filed against US servicemen? In what way is a Marine shooting somebody because he thought they were a threat (even if they in fact were unarmed) and a SEAL beating a prisoner to death? Unless you are implying that you believe that Lt. Pantano killed these men just because he could. If thats the case show your proof.

Personally I just think you enjoy stirring up an argument, which is fine if others choose to take it up with you. At least keep it on the thread topic. If the title were "US soldiers keep killing Iraqi's", it would be a different story.
 
RRouuselot said:
Maybe I should have said misunderstanding my comment and then quoting it out of context.
It was quoted exactly within context. You sarcastically stated, categorically, that charging people with murder in times of war was, categorically, like charging people with speeding at an auto race.

RRouuselot said:
Do I think nobody should never be charged with murder in a war zone? No, there are most definitely some cases where they should be.
This is the first time you've suggested anything of the sort.

RRouselot said:
Just out of curiosity do you think we should charge bomber pilots and their crews from WWII, Korean, and Vietnam wars with murder since they killed literally millions of innocent men, women and children?
No, I don't. And I don't think the question is even slightly relevant. Nowhere in this discussion has anyone suggested that all kinds of killing in warfare is murder, nor that all people who practiced it are should be charged with murder, regardless of whether those acts should have been carried out.
 
PeachMonkey said:
1)It was quoted exactly within context. You sarcastically stated, categorically, that charging people with murder in times of war was, categorically, like charging people with speeding at an auto race.


2) This is the first time you've suggested anything of the sort.


3) No, I don't. And I don't think the question is even slightly relevant. Nowhere in this discussion has anyone suggested that all kinds of killing in warfare is murder, nor that all people who practiced it are should be charged with murder, regardless of whether those acts should have been carried out.
1)Was it? Thanks for clarifying what I am thinking for me….what would I do without. Obviously sarcasm is lost on you.

2)And?????

3)This reminds me of the line from Tom Cruise’s movie Collateral….. “10, 000 people are killed in Rwanda and you don’t care…. I off one fat Angelino and you throw a hissy fit”


In the “BIG picture” a loss of life is a loss of life and can never be brought back.
 
PeachMonkey said:
This is the first time you've suggested anything of the sort.
Also, dont forget that just because someone does not talk about somthing, does not mean they dont believe it.

Ive never said we should give food to the homless, but It doesnt mean I dont, wouldnt, or havn't.

Just food for thought. (no pun intended)
 
Actually, the defense's claim in the, "Lieutenant L.," case is that the death happened in CIA custody, and they should be the ones accused of murder.

I also have no idea whether Lt. Pantano should even have been charged, let alone convicted. I'm assuming that he wasn't charged just for the hell of it...but I haven't seen the evidence, and I wasn't there.

However, I don't see what the big logical leap is about: same war, same basic charge, same branch of service, same time frame, same context of Bush Administration encouraging torture, illegal detention, etc.
 
Did you even read what happened with Lt. Pantano?

As to the "same branch of service" statement. Im waiting for the Marines here to flip over being called the Navy.......(The Branches of Service: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard...SEALS are Navy)
 
http://www.defendthedefenders.org/quotes.html

An Incidental Defense for Ilario Pantano
By MARINE OFFICER
I would like to take a few minutes to present my own defense for a man named Second Lieutenant Ilario Pantano, who has recently been accused of pre- meditated murder in a combat zone, better known as Iraq.

Let me first say that while I know Lieutenant Pantano personally, and am very familiar with the area, in which the alleged murders were committed, I was not present for the incident. However, as far as I can tell, that should not be a factor. Let me explain. It seems to be generally agreed upon that Lieutenant Pantano, at that moment in question, was in a shoot/no shoot scenario. In other words, a situation presented itself, to which he was forced to react urgently. We're talking about a decision point, a judgment call, and the government of the United States is attempting to pass judgment on his. The particulars of the situation, as I will demonstrate, are irrelevant. And I would further suggest that his default to the more aggressive of the two available courses of action (shoot or don't shoot) should in no way have shocked or appalled the government, his countrymen, or his chain of command.

For this argument to be fully appreciated there are some assumptions, five to be precise, that I have made and that I will now present as self- evident or generally recognized fact. If these assumptions are agreed upon as true, which I am confident they will be, then there is little foundation remaining for any accusation of wrong doing on the part of the man I have temporarily (and without his knowledge) claimed as my client.

The first of these assumptions is that war is an instrument of policy. That is to say that war is used to enforce or bring about some political aim. That is also to say that those solely responsible for the application of military force are our civilian governors, not the Generals who are the customary scapegoats for your average anti-war activist. Those civilian governors in our case obviously would be the politicians who represent us. The United States Congress. The White House. And ultimately the President himself who has committed his military force in a War on Terror that has found itself centrally located within the boundaries of Iraq.

The second assumption is that the application of military force assumes the application of violence (i.e. killing). The purpose of war is to impose one government's will on another through violence. That doesn't sound very nice, but it does get to the heart of reality. Governments use military force, violence, where diplomacy fails. It is a deliberate act of hostility in which killing is not only inevitable, but it is expected. This is an important point and is worth repeating. Killing is expected.

The third assumption is that the area where Lieutenant Pantano's incident occurred was extremely dangerous at that time. Maybe this is not so much an assumption as it is a well-documented fact. I know. I was there. It is now commonly referred to as "The Triangle of Death". That is not a confidence-inspiring name, particularly if you happen to be a marine who is charged with its stability. This was a place where enemy activity was rampant, and by rampant I mean daily. IED attacks, mortar and rocket attacks, direct fire ambushes, drive-by shootings, kidnappings, attacks on police stations, abductions, murders, massacres were all taking place at the time of this incident on a daily basis. The environment was quite honestly terrifying, or invigorating if you're Ilario Pantano. This brings me to my next assumption, which is also more of a well-known fact than a postulation. You see Ilario Pantano, as anyone who has ever been in his presence for five minutes can tell you, is an extremely passionate man. He is a passionate man who is passionate about killing terrorists. He gave up a lucrative career in Manhattan to fight back against terrorists who would attempt to victimize his city. He for one was not going to let that happen. So he joined up. He fought back. He brought all his passion to bear on a very zealous enemy.

My last assumption requires a somewhat more lengthy discussion. This is a discussion of human nature. Human beings, all human beings, all over the world including marines, are naturally resistant to killing other human beings. Ninety-eight percent of society finds the taking of another human life morally reprehensible. That's a fact, a fact that I would say we, as a species for all our destructiveness, ought to be proud of, but an inconvenient reality for the military. In WWII only fifteen to twenty percent of men on the battlefield actually shot their weapons at the enemy. (There are, incidentally, many well-documented studies that have shown that this lack of firing back was not due to fear of death or injury. It was almost entirely based upon a reluctance to kill.) Now while that fact may be little known in civilian circles, it is well enough known to the professionals of war. At least it is now. But it wasn't always. That figure was staggering to military leaders when they first discovered it a half century ago and not a little bit disheartening, and they knew in order to more effectively gain fire superiority in future battles they would have to overcome this problem. They did. By Viet Nam that figure was up to ninety-five percent. Here's what they learned.

There are three principal factors when attempting to mitigate, in men, the disinclination to kill. There are certainly a whole host of variables that affect each individual as they attempt to take the life of an enemy combatant, but as a rule these are the three big ones. The first is an acknowledgment by the group that what a man is doing is socially acceptable. The group, for say a marine in a position to kill in combat, can exist on many levels. Of course there is his immediate unit, his fire team, his squad, his platoon, his closest friends with him on the battlefield and so on, and that is certainly an important group. And then there is the Marine Corps as a community, which also can provide a general climate of approval for all of its members. But the most powerful group that he will look to for acceptance, for the killing he has done, is his society. He will want to inoculate himself against the remorse that he is sure to face with society's praise and justifications. (That might shed some light, by the way, on why there is such an emphasis on supporting the troops. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder cases that have arisen from wars are not generally from the terrible things that happened to those men, or the terrible things that they saw, but from the terrible things that they did. Guilt is the primary ingredient for the majority of those men. Hence the stark contrast between the number of PTSD cases from WWII where the percentage of men willing to fire was relatively low and society's approval was high compared to Viet Nam where the percentage of men willing to fire on the enemy was high, while at the same time society's approval was much lower.)

The second factor in mitigating this human resistance to killing is leadership. Leaders in the military serve the purpose not only to set an aggressive example for the troops to follow, but to exist as authority figures to which those same troops can displace their guilt when faced with the horrors of combat. In short, it is easier to obey an order to kill than to kill by one's own volition. The case studies of this phenomenon are vast, conducted over many years, and widely available so I will assume in this instance that people are generally aware of its truth and will argue my point here no further. Now the last of the principal factors in getting a man to kill, getting him to shoot vice not shoot, is desensitization. Over the decades, getting soldiers to not look so gravely upon the subject of killing has been an integral part of increasing combat efficiency, (i.e. increasing the number of men who will actually fire their weapons at enemy troops). The specific methods used to desensitize these men are numerous. Here are just a few:

I would have to say the frequent and callous discussion of war, of combat, of killing is the most prolific technique used in the military today to desensitize its troops. These kinds of discussions can be heard on military bases all over the world, all the time, and for such talk the military man is often lambasted as a warmonger. This, however, is generally not the case. In fact, as I've mentioned before, a very minute population in the military could accurately be characterized as such. But the callous talk of killing continues nonetheless. Why? It is a cultural norm now, created to desensitize men to the concept of killing. When a recruit at boot camp acknowledges a command from his Drill Instructor, he shouts out a blood curdling, "KILL!" The motto on a Marine Corps rifle range is "One shot, one kill." When marines pass each other around the base they will often use the affectionate greeting "Oohrah!" which is the Marine Corps' modified version of the Turkish word for "Kill". When Lieutenant General James Mattis was quoted saying, "It's fun to shoot some people," and that "it's a hoot" he was met with significant criticism. People were appalled. They were horrified even. But oddly enough, there was no real shock from within the ranks of the Marine Corps. While the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Hagee, did express some regret for the callous remarks, and suggested that General Mattis should have chosen his words more carefully, he was certainly not appalled. Why? The fact is, he knows, just as every other marine knows, that this is exactly the kind of language that is used all around the Marine Corps at all levels of command, all the time. Making callous remarks about killing is not merely a reality in the military, it is a necessity. There is not one combat leader in Iraq who does not speak of violence and killing with some degree of callousness, if not enthusiasm. You have to, if you want to train those young boys to do what they are naturally so loathe to do. Yo u have to, if you want to transform those young boys into killers. I know that sounds terribly harsh to those soft ears out there who don't want to think of their sons as trained killers, who cannot bear the thought of their baby's innocence being stripped away by the military machine, who do not want to hear that killing is a central purpose of their job, who can't seem to accept that rifles are for killing, not parades, who have not experienced what General Hagee called "the harsh realities of war." I know they don't want to hear it, but it is true all the same.

The Marine Corps uses computer games now, to minimize the cost of training perhaps, but also to allow the "player" to identify and kill an enemy. The weapons in the game are realistic, the graphics are realistic, the view of the screen can be made to look like the sights of a rifle or a machine gun and you can focus on a man running or shooting back at you and you can kill him. The man will fall and bleed on the ground. It's very realistic. When infantrymen train with their rifles, they don't shoot at colored circles; they shoot at silhouettes, black silhouettes of men, or they shoot at plastic dummies that look like enemy soldiers and pop up and fall down when they're hit. They fire from fighting holes and they wear battle gear, flak jackets and helmets to give them the feel of war. They make shooting a target so much like shooting a man that it is really not that difficult to make the transition. And when a man shoots well he is admired and given medals and badges and promotions. All this to encourage a man to pull the trigger with another man in his sights and kill him. Marine recruits will participate in bayonet training where there are dummies that hang upright, dressed in military attire, that are heavy like a man, and as dense as a man, which have replaced the old inanimate stacks of tires that were once used. To thrust a blade into the flesh of another human being has been historically more difficult for men than say slashing him. It is more personal. It is more gruesome. It is more deadly. And that is exactly why it is a necessary skill. When recruits train, they train to thrust the bayonet into the man sized, military attired dummy to get them comfortable with the concept, with the motion, with the feel of killing another man. Like it or not, that is desensitization, and that is critical to the man who must fight that zealous enemy or die from inaction.

So if we take all these assumptions, all these points together, and if we agree that Second Lieutenant Ilario Pantano is a passionate man, fighting passionately the War on Terror that his country has dispatched him on (understanding innately that this will require killing), and he is spending his time in a highly dangerous city in Iraq, getting attacked on a daily basis by those very terrorists he's been sent in to kill, and he is a marine who not only has been conditioned himself by the design of the military (a.k.a. the government) to be callous towards killing but also to be an aggressive leader, a figure of authority in a combat zone that must turn boys into killers (no easy task), and that man, that officer, Second Lieutenant Ilario Pantano, is faced with a split second decision in the face of two known terrorists who make a sudden move toward him with unknown intent, what do we think he's going to do? He's going to do what he was trained to do by his government, fight and if necessary, kill. He's going to do what he was asked to do by his country, eliminate the threat of terror in the world. He's going to do what he was born to do, passionately defend himself and those he cares about. He's going to do exactly what we would expect him to do. There is no reason why anyone should be surprised that this man opted for the aggressive course of action under the circumstances he was in. There is no reason why anyone should be appalled.

If we agree that this was in fact a shoot/no shoot scenario, and we all agree to the assumptions I've made herein, then the question of pre-meditated murder is a simple one. It's academic. We don't have to have been there. Based on all that we understand of the world and of war and of the military, we know, without having seen or even heard a shot fired, that Ilario Pantano is innocent of this charge, and that if anyone is responsible for his reaction to these terrorists it is the government of the United States, the very same people who declared this War on Terror, the very same people who embraced him as a passionate officer and trained him to kill and to train his marines to kill, the very same people who sent him to kill those terrorists that day in Iraq, and the very same people who now charge him with murder. He did all that they asked. He did all that the Marine Corps asked. He did all that his country asked. If there is fault to be had in this case, it is with those who have done the asking,not with Ilario Pantano.

I rest my case.
 
RRouuselot said:
1)Was it? Thanks for clarifying what I am thinking for me….what would I do without. Obviously sarcasm is lost on you.
I can't clarify what you're thinking, but what you stated was clear for everyone to see. Your sarcasm clearly wasn't lost, since I used the word "sarcastically" in my description -- do try to keep up with the conversation, please

RRouuselot said:
2)And?????
*And*, up until now, your only comments on the situation were a sarcastic comment about how no one in a time of war should be charged with murder. Without doing the mind-reading you accused me of above, it would be difficult to determine any other position.

RRouuselot said:
3)This reminds me of the line from Tom Cruise’s movie Collateral….. “10, 000 people are killed in Rwanda and you don’t care…. I off one fat Angelino and you throw a hissy fit”
It's interesting how you would compare a looting, murdering genocide to aerial warfare which has not been clearly declared a violation of international law; and moreover, how the offhanded brutal line of a murderer in a Hollywood film suffices for your response to a topic you brought up which was already irrelevant to the thread at hand.

It all becomes clear to me, however -- you've been a troll from the very beginning with your sarcastic comment about murder and speed tickets.
 
PeachMonkey said:
It all becomes clear to me, however -- you've been a troll from the very beginning with your sarcastic comment about murder and speed tickets.
Nope, not a troll but if you think I am then you don't need to respond to my posts.

Actually I think quite the opposite is true. I think you are the "troll" since you are the one that has picked issue with every comment I made and can’t seem to move on.
 
Axly, in a rational society Curtis LeMay's *** would've been in jail for the Tokyo Fire raids of 1944, war or no war....and so would've been some Brit asses, for what they did to Dresden.

Of course, we don't have one of those societies. But if I see one, I'm moving there immediately.
 
What about that Lt. Pantano though huh? What a murdering ******* he is huh?
 
rmcrobertson said:
Axly, in a rational society Curtis LeMay's *** would've been in jail for the Tokyo Fire raids of 1944, war or no war....and so would've been some Brit asses, for what they did to Dresden.

Of course, we don't have one of those societies. But if I see one, I'm moving there immediately.
True, LeMay had no real target except "targets of opportunity". He knowingly killed countless of thousands of civilians.



If I am not mistaken the British Gen. in charge of the RAF was nicknamed “The Butcher”. Do a GOOGLE search for "Butcher Harris.

Among one of the most controversial commanders in World War II is Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Marshal of the Royal Air Force and Commander-in-Chief of the RAF Bomber Command from 1942 to 1945. Known as the ‘Butcher’ or the ‘Bomber’, he commanded a relentless area-bombing offensive against Germany. This systematic destruction of German cities caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of German civilians, and has been attacked on moral and ethical grounds. Much of the attack is directed against Sir Arthur Harris himself. Should he be lauded as a hero, who played a large part in helping Britain to secure its victory or reviled as a war criminal, a mass murderer?

Arthur Harris was born on 13 Apr 1892, the son of an Indian Civil Service official. Young Harris left school at the age of 16 and traveled across half the world to Rhodesia where he took on a variety of jobs from gold mining to farming. When World War 1 came in 1914, he joined the Rhodesia Regiment in German South-West Africa as a bugler and fought in the campaign. After Africa, he returned to England and joined the Royal Flying Corps. He was posted to France where he served on the Western Front until he returned to England late in 1917. Promoted to major in 1918, he was given command of a home defence squadron (no. 44) where he was well known as a pioneer in night flying. He was granted a permanent commission in the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1919.

In post-war RAF, he served in several countries, including India and Iraq where he took command of several bomber squadrons. He returned to Britain at the end of 1924 and assumed command of 58 Squadron. In his command of the squadron from 1925 to 1927, he made many improvements in the squadron’s navigational methods and in night bombing. It was around this time that the prominence of air power in future wars began to surface with General Gulio Douhet in Italy, and in the United States, General Billy Mitchell, propounding theories that an enemy could be bombed into submission with little help from the army and the navy.

Between 1930 and 1933 Harris was employed in staff duties in Egypt and took command of 210 Squadron, a flying boat unit based at Pembroke Dock on his return. In 1933, he was appointed as Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence and was promoted to the rank of Group Captain. In the same year, Hitler came into power in Germany. Germany withdrew from the Geneva Conference and the League of Nations and Britain prepared for the possibility of war in five to eight years’ time.

Such was the political situation in England when Harris was appointed as Deputy Director of Plans in the Air Ministry in 1934. In this position, he was able to influence air policy. In the same year, the Air Ministry Bombing Committee was set up with the role of bomber operations being defined as counter-offensive. However, with Hitler in power and the possibility of war increasing, plans began to be drawn up for the xpansion of Britain’s bombing force, in part to counter Hitler’s claim that the German Luftwaffes could match the air power of the RAF. In 1937, Harris, on being promoted to Air Commodore took command of the newly formed No. 4 Group of Bomber Command. He remained in the post until July of the next year when he was posted overseas to Palestine and Transjordan, tasked with helping the Army keep civil order between the Arabs and the Jews. He returned yet again to England in 1939 on a spell of sick leave.

Britain declared war on Germany on 3 Sep 1939. Harris then had command of the No. 5 Group of the Bomber Command. In Feb 1942, he was chosen to succeed AM Sir Richard Peirse as the Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command. Under Harris’ dynamic leadership and single-minded pursuit, the Bomber Command rapidly expanded. He turned around what was a poorly equipped force and poorly trained aircrew with a record of dropping bombs which missed their targets, into a highly efficient force. Harris was convinced that strategic bombing on a large scale would cause the collapse of the German industry and break the morale of the German people and ultimately bring about Germany’s defeat. His conviction was given impetus with the Casablanca Directive, drawn up by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Jan 1943, which gave him the authority to go on a sustained assault on German cities.

Major urban areas such as Hamburg and the industrial cities of Ruhr came under the Bomber’s attacks between 1943 and 1945. Night attacks on Hamburg killed more than 41,000 people. In the closing months of the war, Dresden, one of the few remaining large, built up but unbombed city was singled out. It was the attack on this medieval city in Feb 1945 that attracted the most criticism. Dresden was of minor industrial significance but was crammed with refugees. Estimated death toll varies from 35,000 to 135,000. On 16 Apr 1945, with the end of the war in sight, the Chiefs of Staff announced the ending of area bombing. Germany surrendered unconditionally on 7 May 1945.

In the six years of the Bomber Command (three and a half of them under Harris’ command), it despatched at least 297,663 sorties by night and 66,851 by day and dropped almost one million tons of bombs. It is estimated that Harris’s bombing campaign killed 500,000 German civilians, injured another 1 million and destroyed 3 million homes. Harris argued that the attacks on the German cities were justified as they helped to shorten the war and saved numerous allied lives. This argument did not quell his critics. British civilian victims of German bombs were estimated to be about 60,000 compared with 500,000 German victims of British bombs. Criticism and hostility towards Harris grew with the passage of time. There were critics who were against any bombings of civilians at all and there were those who thought that bombing of German cities was justified in the early part of the war but that it should be switched to precision bombing of selected targets in the later years.

There was yet another group of critics who critised the operational conduct of the campaign. The Bomber Command also suffered heavy losses - about 55,000 aircrew were killed, most of them officers and NCOs with 40,000 aircrew deaths attributable to the period under Harris’s command. Questions have been raised as to whether the results justify the sacrifices made by the aircrew.

On the other hand, those who try to take a more objective stand may well point that the widescale bombing of German cities did not begin with Harris but with the two Commanders-in-Chiefs who preceded him, ACM Charles Portal and AM Richard Peirse. Although Harris himself had a firm belief in the bombing of German cities, it was those further up the ranks, including the War Cabinet, who gave him the tacit approval, and who should shoulder the blame.

Although Harris was promoted Air Marshal at the end of the war in 1945, he was not made a peer unlike the other high commanders of the war. Politicians, including Churchill did not want to be too closely linked with the Bomber Command. Some felt that he had been made a scapegoat of political expediency. Harris retired from the RAF in 1946 and left for his beloved South Africa where he ran a shipping business until he returned to England in 1953. He was offered a peerage belatedly in 1953 but he accepted only a baronetcy. He died in 1984 at the age of 91.
 
Please point out exactly where it was that I described Lt. Pantaro as a murderer, or even suggested that. I simply said--rather clearly, I believe--that the exigencies of war did not justify everything.

As for, "Bomber," Harris, yes, I'd forgotten. Emotionally speaking, I have some trouble with feeling all that bad for German civilians...but what the RAF and our own Air Force did in Dresden, nothing justifies.
 
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