Maneuver Warfare

[Blotan Hunka]

Military art, over the course of history, has pretty much fluctuated between Attrition Warfare and Manuver Warfare. Put briefly, Attrition Warfare involves massing men and material and moving them against enemy strongpoints. Victory is measured by enemy killed, infrastructure destroyed and territory taken. Throughout most of human history this is how war has been fought. Manuver Warfare advocates that through strategic movement, one can more easily defeat an opposing force than he can by contacting the enemy and fighting him until he runs out of forces or the will to fight. In Manuver Warfare, you look to bypass enemy strongpoints, break into his rear areas and cut off communication and supply, leaving the enemy confused and the strongpoints left on the vine to wither and die.

Historically,one can see the beginnings of Manuver Warfare in the "Stormtrooper" tactics of the Germans in the trenches of WWI. Instead of massing human wave attacks in suicide runs on fixed enemy positions, the Germans sent highly trained, manuverable elements against enemy weakpoints with the mission to avoid enemy strongpoints and to attack enemy headquarters and artillery emplacements. Simultaneously, the Allies were developing the Tank to find a way out of trench warfare. WWI ended before any of these tactics could reach full maturity. The combination of these elements finally came to fruition during WWII in the, then revolutionary, military tactic of the Blitzkrieg. Which the Germans "stole" form a British generals theory paper that was ignored by the British military.

Since speed of operations and initiative is critical to the success of maneuver warfare, command structures need to be decentralised, with freedom to make tactical decisions given to lower-level unit leaders. This decentralised command structure allows 'on the ground' unit leaders, while still working within the guidelines of commander's overall vision, to exploit enemy weaknesses as they become evident. This is also called the 'recon-pull' tactic. As point units recon the enemy positions and find weaknesses, they "pull" the follow on forces through these gaps after them. General Patton was an innovator in this practice. Instead of ordering units to act in accordance to his "plan". Patton told his subordinates what he wanted accomplished and left it up to them to decide the best way to make it happen. Due to the speed, flexibility, communication and technological demands of Manuver Warfare, it requires that ones military be more highly trained and technologically capable than its attrition oriented opponent.

 

[Steel Tiger]

The concepts of Move and Maneuver are older than WWI. The nations of Europe were developing them through the ninteenth century in response to the disastrous conflicts like the Crimean War. By the time WWI came around the British and Germans, at least, had exception Move and Maneuver strategies which completely bogged down when trenches started to be dug to protect the minimal gains won in France. The trench race then bagan.

The Stormtroopers were definitely an attempt toreturn to the principles of Move and Maneuver but I think it was too little too late for Germany. It would have to wait twenty years when more effective vehicles were available to facilitate rapid movement of troops in response to orders that could change quickly.

Definitely, the blitzkreig war-machine was a very good example of superior technology and command structure allowing for the proper implementation of strategic maneuvering.

 

[Blotan Hunka]

There has been "maneuver" in warfare for a long time, granted. Napoleon was noted for his rapid manuvers, cavalry employment and deployment of cannon. Napoleon was able to Maneuver and strike at will, defeating larger opponents. But at its root, just like in our US Civil War (with Gen. Jackson and his Valley campaign of march and countermarch as an example), the end objective was still to mass fire on the enemy and kill as many of them as you could. Manuver in attrition warfare is not "Maneuver Warfare". I still say that WWI was the real start line, it was where the necessity of new tactics began to meet communications technology and the mechanized ability to employ true manuver warfare. The pause between wars let the Germans put all the pieces together.

Maneuver in Attrition Warfare, was being able to get your troops into advantageous position for battle. To a troop up against MW, the entire attacking force has bypassed you and they are pushing deep into your rear areas. In effect you are surrounded. After pasting you with some air, arty etc to keep you pinned while they bypass you, your position looks like the moon. Perhaps a few mortar rounds are still landing around you to let you know they are still thinking about you as their armored vehicles stream by outside the range of your weapons. Many regular troops will think about surrendering. As the Iraqis did in Gulf War I.

Of course manuver warfare is what you use against another Army. Insurgency, low intensity conflict...thats a whole different animal.

 

[Steel Tiger]

Of course manuver warfare is what you use against another Army. Insurgency, low intensity conflict...thats a whole different animal.

I can see a lot of changes in the military to deal with insurgency and low intensity conflict. Do you think that the change in emphasis for todays military will be detrimental if something like a full blown war erupts? Is it possible that the military's change of role, to a degree, is going to be problematic if they are needed in a major conflict?

 

[Blotan Hunka]

I dont think our militray will ever entirely "retool" to be a "low intensity force". We will always train to defeat Armies IMO. What I think may need to be done is retrain some select divisions or brigades as counterinsurgency teams that will take the handoff from the "stand-up fight" to the guerrilla/insurgent fight. Id prefer that then tossing line infantry into the insurgency fight, which is better dealt with by SF, but in larger numbers than SF can field.

 

[Blotan Hunka]

Some military strategists are saying that we are starting a "4th generation" of warfare. The 1st was massed manpower like 16th-19th century Warfare (Revolution, Napoleon, Civil War). The 2nd was massed firepower, like the machine gun swept, artillery pounded no-mans lands of WWI. The 3rd was/is manuver warfare starting with Blitzkreig right up to Gulf War 1. Now they are saying we are entering into a 4th generation where the huge disparity in military forces are forcing opponents to adopt new means. Most are saying that the insurgency and terrorist tactics are a manifistation of this change.

 

[Bob Hubbard]

I've seen several references that Gen James Longstreet was a proponent of maneuver based tactics, and that he had repeatedly recommended them at Gettysburg, but was overruled by Lee.

 

[Steel Tiger]

I've seen several references that Gen James Longstreet was a proponent of maneuver based tactics, and that he had repeatedly recommended them at Gettysburg, but was overruled by Lee.

Something very strange happened at Gettysburg. I think that Longstreet was recommending that Lee continue to follow the same strategy he had already been following successfully, rather than assault a well entrenched enemy. Perhaps Lee was just getting tired of continual battle and had something of a brain fade.

 

[Bob Hubbard]

Something very strange happened at Gettysburg. I think that Longstreet was recommending that Lee continue to follow the same strategy he had already been following successfully, rather than assault a well entrenched enemy. Perhaps Lee was just getting tired of continual battle and had something of a brain fade.

Might be. From what I've read, Lee's idea was a 3 prong attack, just 2 of the prongs didn't fire, and that let the main thrust be blunted. On the 3rd, there was a heavy suggestion of swinging to the right and then hitting the edge, and I've seen at least 2 "what ifs" that suggest Longstreet wanted to flank the Union, head southeast a bit and put the Confederates on high ground between Gettysburg and Washington, forcing the Union to come to them. Somewhere I've got notes that have likened Longstreet and Jacksons tactics to those used by the Germans early in WWII. (though without the tanks and planes of course )

 

[Jonathan Randall]

Might be. From what I've read, Lee's idea was a 3 prong attack, just 2 of the prongs didn't fire, and that let the main thrust be blunted. On the 3rd, there was a heavy suggestion of swinging to the right and then hitting the edge, and I've seen at least 2 "what ifs" that suggest Longstreet wanted to flank the Union, head southeast a bit and put the Confederates on high ground between Gettysburg and Washington, forcing the Union to come to them. Somewhere I've got notes that have likened Longstreet and Jacksons tactics to those used by the Germans early in WWII. (though without the tanks and planes of course )

From a military perspective, Gettysburg is perhaps the biggest What If of the War Between the States. Politically, the biggest What If is if Lincoln had not been elected to a scond term, would the North have made peace with an independent Confederacy? The war, after all, was, contrary to most people's beliefs today, extraordinarly unpopular in large parts of the North.

 

[Bob Hubbard]

True.

I think that in our modern age, the US Civil war probably saw some maneuver style warfare, though the bulk of it was the same mass charge and such we saw 45 years later in WWI.

Interestingly enough, I've seen mention that the Celts used a variation of it, in that their chariots would drop off and pick up troops from the battle line, as well as serve as a sort of rapid response force. I've also seen similar references to both the Huns and Mongols, and, the Egyptians. The later is reported to have been able to match an apache gunship in firerate with only 50 chariot based archers in motion making charge and retreat attacks against enemy infantry. The Mongols would charge, retreat, then turn and attack when combating the Persians.

I think the invention and implementation of the telegraph during the US Civil War though, made rapid troop deployments possible, as news of enemy movements could be relayed in minutes, rather than hours or days, and counters begun.

 

[Jonathan Randall]

True.

I think that in our modern age, the US Civil war probably saw some maneuver style warfare, though the bulk of it was the same mass charge and such we saw 45 years later in WWI.

Interestingly enough, I've seen mention that the Celts used a variation of it, in that their chariots would drop off and pick up troops from the battle line, as well as serve as a sort of rapid response force. I've also seen similar references to both the Huns and Mongols, and, the Egyptians. The later is reported to have been able to match an apache gunship in firerate with only 50 chariot based archers in motion making charge and retreat attacks against enemy infantry. The Mongols would charge, retreat, then turn and attack when combating the Persians.

I think the invention and implementation of the telegraph during the US Civil War though, made rapid troop deployments possible, as news of enemy movements could be relayed in minutes, rather than hours or days, and counters begun.

That's interesting, because I just finished a documentary on the Celts and one expert was comparing the Confederate manner of warfare (including the Rebel Yell), with the manner in which the Celts waged war.

I've also read that had WW1 Generals seriously studied the American Civil War, they would not have been bogged down in trench warfare to the degree that they were.

IMO, although I have no "educated" reason for saying so, believe that the Egyptians at their peak, circa 1200 B.C., would have been a match for the Roman Legions of 100 A.D.

 

[Blotan Hunka]

Again, there is a difference between manuever in Attrition Warfare and true Maneuver Warfare. Namely in the goal of bypassing enemy strength and cutting of command and control. And in the way forces are allowed more independence of action based on the commanders intent. While Jackson was a brilliant Maneuverist, in the end it was still all about standing up and slugging it out with whatever the enemy would throw at you. Avoiding a battle you cannot win and positioning yourself for one you can, while brilliant, is not real MW. Here is an excellent write up about MW.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/HPE.htm

 

[Blotan Hunka]

I've also read that had WW1 Generals seriously studied the American Civil War, they would not have been bogged down in trench warfare to the degree that they were.

IMO, Civil War tactics in WWI would have had the same results as having machine guns in the Civil War. Both would have been bigger bloodbaths than they already were. The underlying problem in each war was the philosophy of victory through destruction of the enemies forces. They then believed that victory was achieved by "killing them all". MW is based on the idea that its easier to achieve victory by making the enemy give up. Thats achieved by making it impossible for them to conduct standard operations. It either forces them to surrender or resort to guerrilla/insurgency operations. Which is the next generation of warfare.

 

[Blotan Hunka]

One of the "must reads" in MW. The USMC FMFM1 "Warfighting".

http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/Warfighting/Warfighting.htm

One small excerpt.

MANEUVER WARFARE

The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. But in order to fully appreciate what we mean by maneuver we need to clarify the term. The traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage. However, in order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver in time as well; that is, we generate a faster operational tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver in both dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.
Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.
From this definition we see that the aim in maneuver warfare is to render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering his moral and physical cohesion--his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole--rather than to destroy him physically through incremental attrition, which is generally more costly and time-consuming. Ideally, the components of his physical strength that remain are irrelevant because we have paralyzed his ability to use them effectively. Even if an outmaneuvered enemy continues to fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy the remnants with relative ease because we have eliminated his ability to fight effectively as a force.
This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, the suppressive effects of firepower are essential to our ability to maneuver. Nor do we means to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. But the aim is not an unfocused application of firepower for the purpose of incrementally reducing the enemy's physical strength. Rather, it is the selective application of firepower in support of maneuver to contribute to the enemy's shock and moral disruption. The greatest value of firepower is not physical destruction--the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly--but the moral dislocation it causes.
If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy's cohesion, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which he cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must be made to see his situation not only as deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.
Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of combat, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. Through the use of greater tempo and velocity, we seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late--until eventually he is overcome by events.
Also inherent is the need for violence, not so much as a source of physical attrition but as a source of moral dislocation. Toward this end, we concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and how it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy's ability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness, against which we will direct all available combat power. And when the decisive opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion.
The final weapon in our arsenal is surprise, the combat value of which we have already recognized. By studying our enemy we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to shape his expectations. Then we will dislocate them by striking at an unexpected time and place. In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer several courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose.

 

[5-0 Kenpo]

Good topic, though I would disagree with some points:

1. The object of manuever warfare is not

you look to bypass enemy strongpoints, break into his rear areas and cut off communication and supply, leaving the enemy confused and the strongpoints left on the vine to wither and die.

The key to maneuver warfare is to find the enemys center of gravity: that thing without which the enemy can not function. This does not, necessarily, coincide with his communications and supplies. It could refer to a general upon which the enemys forces depends, a symbolic territory, which if lost, could so demoralize his forces that he could not continue. And sometimes, this includes destroying key units, which to my understanding you would consider attrition, though I would argue that this in not an accurate assesment.

I would also argue against the fact that modern technology is a necessary component of maneuver warfare. It is not so much technology, as it is an understanding of the commanders intent and resolution to see it to completion that is necessary. And, as you say, this requires a lot of initiative and training on the part of every soldier, down to the lowly private.

The evolution of the American version of maneuver warfare was brought about by the late Col. John Boyd (U.S. Air Force). He read thousands of books and studied just as many battles to determine how to wage the most effective form of warfare. For a large part of his positive understandings of what we now term maneuver warfare, he turned to the likes of Sun Tzu, Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Belisarius, Genghis Khan, etc., who were here long before WWII occured.

In fact, the Marine Corp Warfighting Manual is a direct result of his research and input (which, unfortunately, the Air Force never adopted).

 

[Blotan Hunka]

Cant argue much against you there. However I do believe that without highly developed communications to relay "recon pull" data to exploit opportunities, and rapid means of transport MW as we know it couldnt exist.

 

[Blotan Hunka]

Regarding communications and mechanization. WWI and the resultant trench warfare was a direct result of a revolution in firepower without similar advances in mobility and communications.

From Wikipedia

The first development that was essential for trench warfare was the introduction of mass-conscripted armies during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Prior to this, armies still consisted of small numbers of troops, which were unable to defend a large territory for very long—battles were either brief or degenerated into siege warfare. Large armies made it much more difficult for one army to outflank another, but it was still possible with cavalry and infantry charges for one army to break another by a direct assault. An example of an early fortified military line that stretched for many miles was the Lines of Torres Vedras (1810), which was built by the Portuguese under the direction of Royal Engineers of the British Army during the Peninsular war.

What made this tactic increasingly suicidal was the development of improved firearm technology in the mid-19th century. When the American Civil War began in 1861, it was fought with the same tactics that had been used in the era of Napoleon and indeed for several centuries. By the time the war drew to a bloody close in 1865, it had become a preview of the First World War, complete with trenches, Gatling guns, field fortifications, and massive casualties. The Battle of Petersburg, near the end of the war, with its trenches and static formations, contrasts sharply with the early battles, such as the First Battle of Bull Run, where manoeuvre was still possible; and famous charges, such as Pickett's Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg, revealed the military futility of a direct assault on an entrenched opposing line.


Two main factors were responsible for the change. First, there was the proliferation of rifles (such as the .58 Springfield), manufactured in the thousands. Effective at double the range of the typical smoothbore of the Napoleonic era (and able to kill a man at over 1000 m), they enabled men sheltering in a trench or behind an improvised obstacle to hold a body of attackers at a much greater distance than before; attackers were unable to cross the swept zone rapidly enough to avoid prohibitive casualties. (Rifles had been used with considerable success in the American Revolution, but they were used by small, elite sniper units: rifles were not a mass weapon, any more than the longbow had been). Repeating rifles, which appeared late in the Civil War, greatly increased the rate of fire, and thus casualties. Second was the persistence of essentially Napoleonic columnar tactics, which amplified losses; only late in the war did open order (or skirmish line) tactics become standard. Thus, the first response to increased firepower (taking cover), and the second (dispersal of troops) were eventually adopted. The third (armour) was not then an option, as it had been in the face of Welsh or Mongol bows; the fourth, speed (crossing the swept zone faster), was not, either. It would take internal combustion, and an innovative mind, to find the solution.

Other factors appearing after the end of the American Civil War played a part, as well. The first was the development of barbed wire (invented in 1874), which in itself did little harm to anyone but—crucially—could slow the progress of an attacking force and thus allow emplaced machine-gunners and riflemen the time to inflict unacceptable losses. The second was the improvement of artillery. Artillery in one form or another had been a part of warfare since classical times, and from the rise of gunpowder until the development of trench warfare in the 1860s had been the major killing force; it was supplanted only temporarily by the rifle. With the development of steel breechloading guns by Krupp, however, much of its former killing power was restored (as graphically demonstrated in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71). Third was the introduction of high explosive shells, which amplified killing power up to sixteen-fold. Finally, hydraulic recoil mechanisms, pioneered by the French 75 mm M1897 (the famed "French 75") significantly increased the rate of fire. These magnified the effectiveness of artillery to a degree unimaginable in the 1870s. The swept zone between attacker and defender became a "no man's land", too lethal to cross.


These were the conditions that, coupled with advancements in C&C and mechanization gave birth to Blitzkrieg and MW.

 

[5-0 Kenpo]

I would agree with you. There is a need for the command, control, and communications systems to be able to keep pace with the physical speed of the actual forces themselves.

But look at how you frame it: "MW as we know it," within the context of speed. This does not mean that the communication systems of times past were inadequate to the speed of physical forces of that time so as not to be able to perpetuate MW.

 

[Blotan Hunka]

MW as I understand was a development of necessity (as are most military arts eh?). In the past, the methods of massed manpower, massed firepower, static formation worked because thats what worked. As technology changed things, facing off and fighting it out only resulted in slaughter with no strategic gain, as became evident in the Civil War. So new methods developed. As our enemies, outstripped by technology and tactics, saw that military means would be, if not impossible, very costly, they saw that attacking us through terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare and the resultant politics was the better option. Which when you think of it only works out of the kindness of American hearts. The enemy knows the American people believe that they fight for "thruth, justice, and the American way" not conquest, pillage and razed earth policy. In the "old days" of say..the Persian empire, what condition do you think Bagdad would be in right now eh?

I do agree with your "genter of gravity" point however. I was speaking more in terms of a small unit leader than I was as a General or Pentagon Officer.