Beer & Pretzels: The Russian Front

[grydth]

Recently finished "German Defeat in the East 1944-45" by the superb author and researcher Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr.. The book makes it clear that by this time the Russians were able to attrit the Germans into the ground all across the front. Once the Russians managed to learn and execute breakthrough assaults by combined arms armies, all the while grinding the German strength down, it was simply a matter of when they would reach Berlin...

But.... could the Germans have won it in 1941/2?

The arguably worst regimes in the world facing off in the worst slaughter in history... could it have ended the other way?

I would SPECULATE "yes"

Any takers?

 

[arnisador]

But.... could the Germans have won it in 1941/2?

Just not splitting off the force to the south (for the Battle of Kiev etc.) would have greatly helped the Germans. That bought the Moscow area forces time that eventually they put to good use. Could the Germans have done it? A definite possibility, if the military had been making the decisions.

 

[grydth]

The detour to complete the encirclement at Kiev is blamed by many if not most historians for the failure to capture Moscow. I take a different view.

My thought - go ahead and fight that battle. If you don't, you leave 3/4 of a million Russians in your rear and flank. Give them supply and a competent leader (Zhukov replaces Budenny) and they will hound you out of Moscow early in 1942. Replay Napoleon retreat, but with T-34s chasing you...

So go ahead and fight Kiev and the opening stages of Typhoon, too. But do it with the sole aim to bleed the Russians... while your construction troops build a Winter line and supply units amass what you need for the season. The Siberian tide breaks on a prepared German Winter line, the Germans never suffering the forever crippling losses in troops and equipment....

Now what does Spring 1942 look like?

 

[Steel Tiger]

Definitely spring 1942 would have been very different if the Germans had built that second wall for Fortress Europa. The failings do not lay with the tactical or even the field strategic commmand, they can firmly be placed at the feet of the grand strategists. There was clearly a lack of understanding as to just how big a front was being opened up or how many Russians there were.

750 000 in Kiev, perhaps twice that number in and around Moscow. Sure they were not that well equiped, but equally they were not running under time constraints. I figure if the Germans had driven straight into Moscow they would have been trapped by the winter and forced to defend a siege or, as you say, retreat with tens of thousands of Russians hounding them.

I don't know if the Germans could have bled the Russians even if they had wanted to, it just doesn't seem to have fit with the way they fought their campaigns. That being said, one can always change ones way of doing things.

I have never really been sure of the motivation for invading Russia. But remembering that most of the grand strategy was coming from one man it could well have been very petty.

 

[grydth]

The motivations for the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union were the most primitive and savage ones: to conquer land and obtain slaves. When one considers the nature of Stalin's regime on the other side, it can be understood why this was the most savage military campaign of modern times.

The Germans, especially through counter attacks, were able to kill enormous numbers of Russians right up until the final campaigns... and that began to tell upon the Russians in 1944-45. (They still won because the Germans were much worse off, in both men and especially material).

 

[Steel Tiger]

I guess the German troops were not raw recruits but seasoned veterans while the Soviet troops would have been less experienced. I can see how, even with less materiel, the Germans would have caused so much damage to the Russians.

 

[grydth]

The Germans had several successful campaigns behind them already by June 1941. From the level of tank crew/infantry squad/gun team to the level of air force - ground force cooperation, they functioned better than anyone at this time.

Colonel Glantz has illustrated how exactly the opposite conditions prevailed in the Red Army - the German invasion hit them at the worst possible time. Reeling from the officer purges, with a new class of recruits in but not trained, in equipment transition (i.e. from BT-7/T-26 to T-34 and KV-1), with units changing organization and location, and supplies a mess - - - one can see why the battles of 1941 turned out in such a lopsided way despite the Russians often fighting bravely to defend their homes.

The optimum conditions existed in 1941 for attrition warfare against a larger enemy... and that is rare.

The Germans could still kill 4 Russian tanks for every one lost of their own in 1944 - but by then the Russians could afford that, and the Germans could not.